Author Archives: David Snowball

About David Snowball

David Snowball, PhD (Massachusetts). Cofounder, lead writer. David is a Professor of Communication Studies at Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, a nationally-recognized college of the liberal arts and sciences, founded in 1860. For a quarter century, David competed in academic debate and coached college debate teams to over 1500 individual victories and 50 tournament championships. When he retired from that research-intensive endeavor, his interest turned to researching fund investing and fund communication strategies. He served as the closing moderator of Brill’s Mutual Funds Interactive (a Forbes “Best of the Web” site), was the Senior Fund Analyst at FundAlarm and author of over 120 fund profiles.

Northern Global Tactical Asset Allocation Fund (BBALX), September 2011, Updated September 2012

By David Snowball

Objective

The fund seeks a combination of growth and income. Northern’s Investment Policy Committee develops tactical asset allocation recommendations based on economic factors such as GDP and inflation; fixed-income market factors such as sovereign yields, credit spreads and currency trends; and stock market factors such as domestic and foreign earnings growth and valuations.  The managers execute that allocation by investing in other Northern funds and outside ETFs.  As of 6/30/2011, the fund holds 10 Northern funds and 3 ETFs.

Adviser

Northern Trust Investments.  Northern’s parent was founded in 1889 and provides investment management, asset and fund administration, fiduciary and banking solutions for corporations, institutions and affluent individuals worldwide.  As of June 30, 2011, Northern Trust Corporation had $97 billion in banking assets, $4.4 trillion in assets under custody and $680 billion in assets under management.  The Northern funds account for about $37 billion in assets.  When these folks say, “affluent individuals,” they really mean it.  Access to Northern Institutional Funds is limited to retirement plans with at least $30 million in assets, corporations and similar institutions, and “personal financial services clients having at least $500 million in total assets at Northern Trust.”  Yikes.  There are 51 Northern funds, seven sub-advised by multiple institutional managers.

Managers

Peter Flood and Daniel Phillips.  Mr. Flood has been managing the fund since April, 2008.  He is the head of Northern’s Fixed Income Risk Management and Fixed Income Strategy teams and has been with Northern since 1979.  Mr. Phillips joined Northern in 2005 and became co-manager in April, 2011.  He’s one of Northern’s lead asset-allocation specialists.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

None, zero, zip.   The research is pretty clear, that substantial manager ownership of a fund is associated with more prudent risk taking and modestly higher returns.  I checked 15 Northern managers listed in the 2010 Statement of Additional Information.  Not a single manager had a single dollar invested.  For both practical and symbolic reasons, that strikes me as regrettable.

Opening date

Northern Institutional Balanced, this fund’s initial incarnation, launched on July 1, 1993.  On April 1, 2008, this became an institutional fund of funds with a new name, manager and mission and offered four share classes.  On August 1, 2011, all four share classes were combined into a single no-load retail fund but is otherwise identical to its institutional predecessor.

Minimum investment

$2500, reduced to $500 for IRAs and $250 for accounts with an automatic investing plan.

Expense ratio

0.68%, after waivers, on assets of $18 million. While there’s no guarantee that the waiver will be renewed next year, Peter Jacob, a vice president for Northern Trust Global Investments, says that the board has never failed to renew a requested waiver. Since the new fund inherited the original fund’s shareholders, Northern and the board concluded that they could not in good conscience impose a fee increase on those folks. That decision that benefits all investors in the fund. Update – 0.68%, after waivers, on assets of nearly $28 million (as of 12/31/2012.)

UpdateOur original analysis, posted September, 2011, appears just below this update.  Depending on your familiarity with the research on behavioral finance, you might choose to read or review that analysis first. September, 2012
2011 returns: -0.01%.  Depending on which peer group you choose, that’s either a bit better (in the case of “moderate allocation” funds) or vastly better (in the case of “world allocation” funds).  2012 returns, through 8/29: 8.9%, top half of moderate allocation fund group and much better than world allocation funds.  
Asset growth: about $25 million in twelve months, from $18 – $45 million.  
This is a rare instance in which a close reading of a fund’s numbers are as likely to deceive as to inform.  As our original commentary notes:The fund’s mandate changed in April 2008, from a traditional stock/bond hybrid to a far more eclectic, flexible portfolio.  As a result, performance numbers prior to early 2008 are misleading.The fund’s Morningstar peer arguably should have changed as well (possibly to world allocation) but did not.  As a result, relative performance numbers are suspect.The fund’s strategic allocation includes US and international stocks (including international small caps and emerging markets), US bonds (including high yield and TIPs), gold, natural resources stocks, global real estate and cash.  Tactical allocation moves so far in 2012 include shifting 2% from investment grade to global real estate and 2% from investment grade to high-yield.Since its conversion, BBALX has had lower volatility by a variety of measures than either the world allocation or moderate allocation peer groups or than its closest counterpart, Vanguard’s $14 billion STAR (VGSTX) fund-of-funds.  It has, at the same time, produced strong absolute returns.  Here’s the comparison between $10,000 invested in BBALX at conversion versus the same amount on the same day in a number of benchmarks and first-rate balanced funds:

Northern GTAA

$12,050

PIMCO All-Asset “D” (PASDX)

12,950

Vanguard Balanced Index (VBINX)

12,400

Vanguard STAR (VGSTX)

12,050

T. Rowe Price Balanced (RPBAX)

11,950

Fidelity Global Balanced (FGBLX)

11,450

Dodge & Cox Balanced (DODBX)

11,300

Moderate Allocation peer group

11,300

World Allocation peer group

10,300

Leuthold Core (LCORX)

9,750

BBALX holds a lot more international exposure, both developed and developing, than its peers.   Its record of strong returns and muted volatility in the face of instability in many non-U.S. markets is very impressive.

BBALX has developed in a very strong alternative to Vanguard STAR (VGSTX).  If its greater exposure to hard assets and emerging markets pays off, it has the potential to be stronger still.

Comments

The case for this fund can be summarized easily.  It was a perfectly respectable institutional balanced fund which has become dramatically better as a result of two sets of recent changes.

Northern Institutional Balanced invested conservatively and conventionally.  It held about two-thirds in stocks (mostly mid- to large-sized US companies plus a few large foreign firms) and one-third in bonds (mostly investment grade domestic bonds).   Northern’s ethos is very risk sensitive which makes a world of sense given their traditional client base: the exceedingly affluent.  Those folks didn’t need Northern to make a ton of money for them (they already had that), they needed Northern to steward it carefully and not take silly risks.  Even today, Northern trumpets “active risk management and well-defined buy-sell criteria” and celebrates their ability to provide clients with “peace of mind.”  Northern continues to highlight “A conservative investment approach . . . strength and stability . . .  disciplined, risk-managed investment . . . “

As a reflection of that, Balanced tended to capture only 65-85% of its benchmark’s gains in years when the market was rising but much less of the loss when the market was falling.  In the long-term, the fund returned about 85% of its 65% stock – 35% bond benchmark’s gains but did so with low volatility.

That was perfectly respectable.

Since then, two sets of changes have made it dramatically better.  In April 2008, the fund morphed from conservative balanced to a global tactical fund of funds.  At a swoop, the fund underwent a series of useful changes.

The asset allocation became fluid, with an investment committee able to substantially shift asset class exposure as opportunities changed.

The basic asset allocation became more aggressive, with the addition of a high-yield bond fund and emerging markets equities.

The fund added exposure to alternative investments, including gold, commodities, global real estate and currencies.

Those changes resulted in a markedly stronger performer.  In the three years since the change, the fund has handily outperformed both its Morningstar benchmark and its peer group.  Its returns place it in the top 7% of balanced funds in the past three years (through 8/25/11).  Morningstar has awarded it five stars for the past three years, even as the fund maintained its “low risk” rating.  Over the same period, it’s been designated a Lipper Leader (5 out of 5 score) for Total Returns and Expenses, and 4 out of 5 for Consistency and Capital Preservation.

In the same period (04/01/2008 – 08/26/2011), it has outperformed its peer group and a host of first-rate balanced funds including Vanguard STAR (VGSTX), Vanguard Balanced Index (VBINX), Fidelity Global Balanced (FGBLX), Leuthold Core (LCORX), T. Rowe Price Balanced (RPBAX) and Dodge & Cox Balanced (DODBX).

In August 2011, the fund morphed again from an institutional fund to a retail one.   The investment minimum dropped from $5,000,000 to as low as $250.  The expense ratio, however, remained extremely low, thanks to an ongoing expense waiver from Northern.  The average for other retail funds advertising themselves as “tactical asset” or “tactical allocation” funds is about 1.80%.

Bottom Line

Northern GTA offers an intriguing opportunity for conservative investors.  This remains a cautious fund, but one which offers exposure to a diverse array of asset classes and a price unavailable in other retail offerings.  It has used its newfound flexibility and low expenses to outperform some very distinguished competition.  Folks looking for an interesting and affordable core fund owe it to themselves to add this one to their short-list.

Fund website

Northern Global Tactical Asset Allocation

Update – 3Q2011 Fact Sheet

Fund Profile, 2nd quarter, 2012

2013 Q3 Report

[cr2012]

Aston/River Road Independent Value Fund (ARIVX), updated September 2012

By David Snowball

Update: This fund has been liquidated.

Objective and strategy

The fund seeks to provide long-term total return by investing in common and preferred stocks, convertibles and REITs. The manager attempts to invest in high quality, small- to mid-cap firms (those with market caps between $100 million and $5 billion). He thinks of himself as having an “absolute return” mandate, which means an exceptional degree of risk-consciousness. He’ll pursue the same style of investing as in his previous charges, but has more flexibility than before because this fund does not include the “small cap” name.

Adviser

Aston Asset Management, LP. It’s an interesting setup. As of June 30, 2012, Aston is the adviser to twenty-seven mutual funds with total net assets of approximately $10.5 billion and is a subsidiary of the Affiliated Managers Group. River Road Asset Management LLC subadvises six Aston funds; i.e., provides the management teams. River Road, founded in 2005, oversees $7 billion and is a subsidiary of the European insurance firm, Aviva, which manages $430 billion in assets. River Road also manages five separate account strategies, including the Independent Value strategy used here.

Manager

Eric Cinnamond. Mr. Cinnamond is a Vice President and Portfolio Manager of River Road’s independent value investment strategy. Mr. Cinnamond has 19 years of investment industry experience. Mr. Cinnamond managed the Intrepid Small Cap (ICMAX) fund from 2005-2010 and Intrepid’s small cap separate accounts from 1998-2010. He co-managed, with Nola Falcone, Evergreen Small Cap Equity Income from 1996-1998.  In addition to this fund, he manages six smallish (collectively, about $50 million) separate accounts using the same strategy.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

As of October 2011, Mr. Cinnamond has between $100,000 and $500,000 invested in his fund.  Two of Aston’s 10 trustees have invested in the fund.  In general, a high degree of insider ownership – including trustee ownership – tends to predict strong performance.  Given that River Road is a sub-advisor and Aston’s trustees oversee 27 funds each, I’m not predisposed to be terribly worried.

Opening date

December 30, 2010.

Minimum investment

$2,500 for regular accounts, $500 for various sorts of tax-advantaged products (IRAs, Coverdells, UTMAs).

Expense ratio

1.42%, after waivers, on $616 million in assets.

Update

Our original analysis, posted February, 2011, appears just below this update.  It describes the fund’s strategy, Mr. Cinnamond’s rationale for it and his track record over the past 16 years.

September, 2012

2011 returns: 7.8%, while his peers lost 4.5%, which placed ARIVX in the top 1% of comparable funds.  2012 returns, through 8/30: 5.3%, which places ARIVX in the bottom 13% of small value funds.  
Asset growth: about $600 million in 18 months, from $16 million.  The fund’s expense ratio did not change.  
What are the very best small-value funds?  Morningstar has designated three as the best of the best: their analysts assigned Gold designations to DFA US Small Value (DFSVX), Diamond Hill Small Cap (DHSCX) and Perkins Small Cap Value (JDSAX).  For my money (literally: I own it), the answer has been Artisan Small Cap(ARTVX).And where can you find these unquestionably excellent funds?  In the chart below (click to enlarge), you can find them where you usually find them.  Well below Eric Cinnamond’s fund.

fund comparison chart

That chart measures only the performance of his newest fund since launch, but if you added his previous funds’ performance you get the same picture over a longer time line.  Good in rising markets, great in falling ones, far steadier than you might reasonably hope for.

Why?  His explanation is that he’s an “absolute return” investor.  He buys only very good companies and only when they’re selling at very good prices.  “Very good prices” does not mean either “less than last year” or “the best currently available.”  Those are relative measures which, he says, make no sense to him.

His insistence on buying only at the right price has two notable implications.

He’s willing to hold cash when there are few compelling values.  That’s often 20-40% of the portfolio and, as of mid-summer 2012, is over 50%.  Folks who own fully invested small cap funds are betting that Mr. Cinnamond’s caution is misplaced.  They have rarely won that bet.

He’s willing to spend cash very aggressively when there are many compelling values.  From late 2008 to the market bottom in March 2009, his separate accounts went from 40% cash to almost fully-invested.  That led him to beat his peers by 20% in both the down market in 2008 and the up market in 2009.

This does not mean that he looks for low risk investments per se.  It does mean that he looks for investments where he is richly compensated for the risks he takes on behalf of his investors.  His July 2012 shareholder letter notes that he sold some consumer-related holdings at a nice profit and invested in several energy holdings.  The energy firms are exceptionally strong players offering exceptional value (natural gas costs $2.50 per mcf to produce, he’s buying reserves at $1.50 per mcf) in a volatile business, which may “increase the volatility of [our] equity holdings overall.”  If the market as a whole becomes more volatile, “turnover in the portfolio may increase” as he repositions toward the most compelling values.

The fund is apt to remain open for a relatively brief time.  You really should use some of that time to learn more about this remarkable fund.

Comments

While some might see a three-month old fund, others see the third incarnation of a splendid 16 year old fund.

The fund’s first incarnation appeared in 1996, as the Evergreen Small Cap Equity Income fund. Mr. Cinnamond had been hired by First Union, Evergreen’s advisor, as an analyst and soon co-manager of their small cap separate account strategy and fund. The fund grew quickly, from $5 million in ’96 to $350 million in ’98. It earned a five-star designation from Morningstar and was twice recognized by Barron’s as a Top 100 mutual fund.

In 1998, Mr. Cinnamond became engaged to a Floridian, moved south and was hired by Intrepid (located in Jacksonville Beach, Florida) to replicate the Evergreen fund. For the next several years, he built and managed a successful separate accounts portfolio for Intrepid, which eventually aspired to a publicly available fund.

The fund’s second incarnation appeared in 2005, with the launch of Intrepid Small Cap (ICMAX). In his five years with the fund, Mr. Cinnamond built a remarkable record which attracted $700 million in assets and earned a five-star rating from Morningstar. If you had invested $10,000 at inception, your account would have grown to $17,300 by the time he left. Over that same period, the average small cap value fund lost money. In addition to a five star rating from Morningstar (as of 2/25/11), the fund was also designated a Lipper Leader for both total returns and preservation of capital.

In 2010, Mr. Cinnamond concluded that it was time to move on. In part he was drawn to family and his home state of Kentucky. In part, he seems to have reassessed his growth prospects with the firm.

The fund’s third incarnation appeared on the last day of 2010, with the launch of Aston / River Road Independent Value (ARIVX). While ARIVX is run using the same discipline as its predecessors, Mr. Cinnamond intentionally avoided the “small cap” name. While the new fund will maintain its historic small cap value focus, he wanted to avoid the SEC stricture which would have mandated him to keep 80% of assets in small caps.

Over an extended period, Mr. Cinnamond’s small cap composite (that is, the weighted average of the separately managed accounts under his charge over the past 15 years) has returned 12% per year to his investors. That figure understates his stock picking skills, since it includes the low returns he earned on his often-substantial cash holdings. The equities, by themselves, earned 15.6% a year.

The key to Mr. Cinnamond’s performance (which, Morningstar observes, “trounced nearly all equity funds”) is achieved, in his words, “by not making mistakes.” He articulates a strong focus on absolute returns; that is, he’d rather position his portfolio to make some money, steadily, in all markets, rather than having it alternately soar and swoon. There seem to be three elements involved in investing without mistakes:

  • Buy the right firms.
  • At the right price.
  • Move decisively when circumstances demand.

All things being equal, his “right” firms are “steady-Eddy companies.” They’re firms with look for companies with strong cash flows and solid operating histories. Many of the firms in his portfolio are 50 or more years old, often market leaders, more mature firms with lower growth and little debt.

Like many successful managers, Mr. Cinnamond pursues a rigorous value discipline. Put simply, there are times that owning stocks simply aren’t worth the risk. Like, well, now. He says that he “will take risks if I’m paid for it; currently I’m not being paid for taking risk.” In those sorts of markets, he has two options. First, he’ll hold cash, often 20-30% of the portfolio. Second, he moves to the highest quality companies in “stretched markets.” That caution is reflected in his 2008 returns, when the fund dropped 7% while his benchmark dropped 29%.

But he’ll also move decisively to pursue bargains when they arise. “I’m willing to be aggressive in undervalued markets,” he says. For example, ICMAX’s portfolio went from 0% energy and 20% cash in 2008 to 20% energy and no cash at the market trough in March, 2009. Similarly, his small cap composite moved from 40% cash to 5% in the same period. That quick move let the fund follow an excellent 2008 (when defense was the key) with an excellent 2009 (where he was paid for taking risks). The fund’s 40% return in 2009 beat his index by 20 percentage points for a second consecutive year. As the market began frothy in 2010 (“names you just can’t value are leading the market,” he noted), he let cash build to nearly 30% of the portfolio. That meant that his relative returns sucked (bottom 10%), but he posted solid absolute returns (up 20% for the year) and left ICMAX well-positioned to deal with volatility in 2011.

Unfortunately for ICMAX shareholders, he’s moved on and their fund trailed 95% of its peers for the first couple months of 2011. Fortunately for ARIVX shareholders, his new fund is leading both ICMAX and its small value peers by a comfortable early margin.

The sole argument against owning is captured in Cinnamond’s cheery declaration, “I like volatility.” Because he’s unwilling to overpay for a stock, or to expose his shareholders to risk in an overextended market, he sidelines more and more cash which means the fund might lag in extended rallies. But when stocks begin cratering, he moves quickly in which means he increases his exposure as the market falls. Buying before the final bottom is, in the short term, painful and might be taken, by some, as a sign that the manager has lost his marbles. He’s currently at 40% cash, effectively his max, because he hasn’t found enough opportunities to fill a portfolio. He’ll buy more as prices on individual stocks because attractive, and could imagine a veritable buying spree when the Russell 2000 is at 350. At the end of February 2011, the index was close to 700.

Bottom Line

Aston / River Road Independent Value is the classic case of getting something for nothing. Investors impressed with Mr. Cinnamond’s 15 year record – high returns with low risk investing in smaller companies – have the opportunity to access his skills with no higher expenses and no higher minimum than they’d pay at Intrepid Small Cap. The far smaller asset base and lack of legacy positions makes ARIVX the more attractive of the two options. And attractive, period.

Fund website

Aston/River Road Independent Value

2013 Q3 Report

2013 Q3 Commentary

[cr2012]

September 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to what are, historically, the two most turbulent months in the market.  Eight of the Dow’s 20 biggest one-day gains ever have occurred in September or October but so have 12 of the 20 biggest one-day losses.

And that might be a good thing.  Some exceedingly talented investors, like Eric “I Like Volatility” Cinnamond (see below), visibly perk up at the opportunities that panic presents.  And it will help distract us from the fact that, of all the things the two major political parties are about to launch (and they’re gonna launch a lot), the nicest is mud.

I wonder if this explains why the Germans have Octoberfest, but launch it in September?

Gary Black as savior?  Really?

Calamos Investments announced August 23 that they had appointed Gary Black as their new “global co-CIO.”  That was coincident with the departure of Nick Calamos from the co-CIO role.  Mr. Calamos had a sudden urge “to pursue personal interests.”

Gary Black?

That Gary Black? 

Gary Black

Black is most famous for serving for three years as CEO of Janus Investments.  During his watch, at least 15 equity managers left Janus and one won a $7.5 million lawsuit.  At the time of his dismissal (“amicable,” of course), he was reportedly trying to sell Janus to a larger firm.  The board disapproved, though we don’t know whether they disapproved of selling the firm or of Black’s inability to get an appropriate price for it.

A snapshot of Janus Capital Group’s balance sheet doesn’t exactly represent a ringing endorsement of Black’s tenure.

Black comes (12/05) Black goes (12/09)
Revenue $953 million $849 million
Operating expenses 712M 1526M
Operating income 240M (678)M
Earnings per share 0.40 (4.55)
Long-term debt 262 M 792M
Book value per share $11.97 $5.50
Assets under management $135 billion $135 billion

(source: Morningstar and the 2009 Janus annual report)

Some might summarize it as: “huge expense, huge controversy, rising debt, falling value.”

Do you suppose, in light of all of that, that the deposed Nick Calamos’s endorsement of Black might have had a tinge of “I hope you like what you get?”  He says, “The Calamos investment team is in good hands given Gary’s significant experience in leading investment teams on a global basis.”

Calamos, of course, is not hiring him as CEO.  Nope. That role is held by the firm’s 72-year-old founder.  They’re hiring him on the basis of his ability as chief investment officer.

How does he do as CIO?  Well, a lot of his retooled Janus funds absolutely cratered in the 2008 meltdown.  And his own investment firm doesn’t seem poised to appear on the cover of Barron’s quite yet.  Part of the agreement includes acquisition of Black’s investment firm, Black Capital Management.  Black Capital has a trivial asset base ($70 million) and a bunch of small separate accounts (average value: $370,000).  Black filed in March to launch his own long-short mutual fund, but it never got off the ground.

Aston / River Road Independent Value reopens

Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX) is an exceptionally good young fund from Eric Cinnamond, a manager who has a great 16 year record as a small cap, absolute return investor.  The fund opened in December 2010, we profiled it with some enthusiasm in February 2011.  The fund quickly established its bona fides, drew a lot of assets and, in a move of singular prudence, was closed while still small and maneuverable.

On September 4, it reopens to new investors.  While that’s good news, it also raises a serious question: “you’re bigger than you were when you closed and you’re sitting at 50% cash, so why on earth is this time to reopen?”

Mr. Cinnamond’s answer comes in two parts.  First, the fund reserved $200 million in capacity for anticipated institutional inflows which never materialized.  At the same time, lots of advisors have been disappointed at getting shut off.  Eric writes:

Yes, the Independent Value Fund is opening again.  The rationale was simple.  The $200 million we set aside for possible institutional investors was not allocated.  In other words, institutional consultants (there are a few exceptions), remain committed to the relative world of investing — a world that has never made sense to me.  Meanwhile, we’ve had like-minded advisors who want to purchase the Fund.  So our capacity target of the Portfolio has not changed, but we have changed our expectation of mix between advisor (the fund) vs. institutional assets (separate accounts).  More advisor assets and fewer institutional assets.

Second, the fund’s cash level and capacity are separate issues.  Right now companies are achieving utterly unsustainable profit margins, which makes them look cheap and attractive.  He shares Jeremy Grantham’s belief (or Jeremy shares Eric’s) that this is a bubble and it will inevitably (and painfully) end when profit margins regress to the mean.  In a non-bubbled world, he would have use for several hundred million dollars more than the fund holds. Again, Mr. Cinnamond:

The other obvious question is, “If you have so much cash, why would you want to grow assets?”  The size of the fund doesn’t impact our cash levels. Our opportunity set drives cash. If the fund is $1 million or $1 billion, cash would be the same percentage of the portfolio. We are simply reopening the fund to fill remaining capacity that was not taken by institutions.

In order to get the get the fund fully invested, I’m going to need higher volatility and improved valuations. With what appears to be an experiment in unlimited balance sheet expansion at the Federal Reserve, the timing of the return of free markets and volatility remains unknown. However, as with the mortgage credit boom and the tech bubble before, what is not sustainable will not be sustained. I am confident of that and I am confident the current profit cycle will revert as all others before it (there has never been a linear profit cycle). As peak corporate margins and profits revert, I believe the fund is position well to take advantage of the eventual return of the risk premium and volatility.

To those who suspect that he or River Road or Aston is simply making an asset grab, he notes that they are not going to market the reopened fund and that they even suspect that they may lose assets as skeptics pull their accounts.

We may actually lose assets initially due to the reopening (it may be frowned upon by some), I really don’t know and have never been too concerned about AUM.  One of my favorite investment quotes of all time is “I would rather lose half of my shareholders than half of their money” (I think this was Jean-Marie Eveillard). I strongly believe in this. Also, we do not plan on actively marketing the fund and my focus will remain on small cap research/analysis and portfolio management. As far as portfolio management goes, I remain committed to not violating our investment discipline of only allocating capital when getting adequately compensated relative to risk assumed.

As he waits for those bigger opportunities, he’s reallocating money toward some attractively priced small cap exploration and production and energy service companies.

We’ve updated our profile of the fund for folks interested in learning more.

Writing about real asset investing: stuff in the ground versus stuff on the page

We’re currently working on an essay about “real asset” investing and the quickly growing pool of real asset investment vehicles.  Real assets are things that have physical properties: precious metals, commodities, residential or commercial real estate, farmland, oil and gas fields, power generation plants, pipelines and other distribution systems, forestland and timber.

Advocates of real asset investing tend to justify inclusion of real assets on either (or both) of two grounds: normal and apocalyptic.

The “normal” argument observes that inflation is deadly to long-term returns, silently eroding the value of all gains. If inflation were to accelerate, that erosion might be dramatic. Neither stocks nor (especially) bonds generate real returns in periods of high and rising inflation. Real assets do.

The “apocalyptic” argument observes that we might be entering a period of increasingly unmanageable imbalances between the supply of everything from food and fertilizer to energy and metals, and the demand for them. The market’s way of addressing that imbalance is to raise the price of the items demanded. That should stimulate production and decrease consumption. Some pessimists, GMO’s Jeremy Grantham prime among them, believe that the imbalance might well be irreparable which will make the owners of resources very rich at the expense of others.

Regardless of which justification you use, you end up with inflation. Investors have the option of addressing inflation through a combination of two strategies: investing in real or tangible assets or investing in inflation-linked derivations. In the first case, you’d buy oil or the stocks of oil producing companies. In the second, you might buy TIPs or commodity index futures. The first strategy is called “real asset” investing. The second is “real return” investing.

Gaining the advantages of real asset investing requires devoting a noticeable but modest portion of your portfolio (5% at the low end and 25% at the high end) to such assets, but doing so with the knowledge that they’ll lag other investments as long as inflation stays low.

While there is a huge discussion of this issue in the institutional investment community, there’s very little directed to the rest of us. There’s only one no-load real assets fund, T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX). The fund was launched for exclusive use in Price’s asset allocation products, such as their Retirement Date funds. It has only recently been made available to the public. There are a half dozen load-bearing funds, two with quite reasonable performance, one diversified real assets ETF and a thousand ETFs representing individual slices of the real asset universe.

I’d planned on profiling both real asset investing and PRAFX this month, but the research is surprisingly complex and occasionally at odds. Rather than rush to print with a second-rate essay, we’ll keep working on it for our October issue.

Note to Paul Ryan, Investor: Focus!

For someone professing great economic knowledge, Paul Ryan’s portfolio reflects the careful discipline of a teenager at the mall. That, at least, is one reading of his 2012 financial disclosure statements on file with the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. (The statement was amended a week later to add a million or so held by his wife in a trust.)

Highlights of his financials:

  • Ryan is a real assets investor. Woo-hoo! Among his largest investments are shares of a mining partnership (Ava O Limited), gravel rights to a quarry in Oklahoma (Blondie & Brownie, LLC – I’m sure Obama’s people are sniffing around that one), IPath Dow Jones UBS Commodity fund, Nuveen Real Estate Securities, and a bunch of assets (time, mineral rights, a cabin?, and land) through the Little Land Company LP.
  • In 2011, he was adding to his real asset holdings. He bought shares of a commodity ETF (and sold part four months later), Pioneer Natural Resources Co, a TIPS fund and (on three occasions) a real estate fund.
  • Directly or through family trusts, Ryan owns about three dozen mutual funds, mostly solid and unexceptional (think Artisan, Fido, Hartford, T Rowe).
  • He’s neither a fan of The Great Man theory of investing nor of passively managed investments. While he owns shares of Berkshire-Hathaway and PIMCO Total Return (PTTRX), the Berkshire holding is trivial ($1-15,000). The PIMCO one, mediated through two trusts, is under $50,000. Bill Gross tweeted approval (“Thanks Paul Ryan @RepPaulRyan @PaulRyanVP for investing in a PIMCO fund. Your reputation as a numbers guy is validated”), conceivably before he noticed that Ryan had been selling his shares in the fund. Other than the ETFs in his partnerships, he has no passive investments and he made 35 portfolio transactions in the year.
  • He hasn’t, for reasons political or economic, bought into the notion of emerging markets. While he has several global or international funds (Artisan, Hartford, Oakmark, Scout, Vanguard), he has just one small sliver of an emerging markets ETF inside a partnership.
  • He’s got a lot of economically inefficiently little investments. Footnotes to the financials reveal a fair number of holdings just above or just below the $1000 reporting threshold.
  • He’s taking care of his three children’s education through two fairly substantial accounts (on in the $50-100,000 range and the other in $100-250,000) in Wisconsin’s 529 plan. That warrants a second woo-hoo.

If you’d like to find out whether your Representative should be trusted with any amount greater than a $20 weekly allowance, all of the member reports are available at the House of Representatives’ financial disclosure page.

Another take on Ryan’s finances comes in a story by Stan Luxenberg at TheStreet.com. There’s a certain irony to the fact that Luxenberg decries Ryan’s jumbled portfolio in a muddled mess of an article. Ryan owns shares of four partnerships (CMR, Little Land Co., Ryan-Hutter Investment and Ryan Limited Partnership) and an IRA. Dramatically simplifying his fund holdings would likely require merging or liquidating those partnerships. Whether the partnerships themselves make sense or are just a tax dodge is a separate question.

Artio implodes?

Artio, formerly Julius Baer, is closing their domestic equity funds. On August 30, 2012, the Artio board voted to shut down Artio US Multicap, US Midcap, US Smallcap and US Microcap funds.

While the closures may have come as a surprise to many, BobC warned members of the Observer discussion board on August 8 of the impending decision. In following up on the lead, he discovered a more ominous problem: that Artio’s famous flagship fund is taking on water fast.

This caused us to probe a bit, and we discovered that Artio’s so-called flagship international funds (BJBIX, JETAX, JETIX, JIEIX) have been bleeding assets like a proverbial stuck pig, if not worse. For the oldest fund BJBIX, which was originally marketed as Julius Baer International Equity Fund in 1993, and where current managers Pell and Younes came aboard in 1995, fund assets peaked in 2007 at just under $11 billion. We started using the fund in the late 1990’s. Today, assets are under $1 billion. A similar disaster has occurred in the other international fund ticker symbols, but they do not have the long, storied history of BJBIX. This fund was once the best-performing international fund, but it never recovered from 2008, following that year’s average numbers by really awful relative performance in 2009-2011. And year to-date it is in the bottom 10%. We exited the fund several years ago when Pell and Younes would no longer take our calls. That’s usually a pretty big red flag that something is amiss.

But based on this, it would appear that Pell and Younes’ purchase of Bank Julius Baer’s U.S. fund management company was the beginning of the end.

Unfortunately, we are now concerned about Artio’s Total Return Bond Fund (JBGIX, BJBGX), which has a tremendous history and great management. If the asset bleed should occur there, for no other reason than perception of the future of Artio as a company, this would be a big problem for investors.

A lively discussion of the company’s future, alternatives and implications followed.  If you haven’t visited the board in a while, you owe it to yourself to drop by.  There’s a remarkable depth of information available there.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.

Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX), update: stubborn short-sightedness on the part of institutional account managers translates to a big win for small investors. When ARIVX closed, they reserved $200 million in capacity for institutional investors who didn’t show up.  That’s give you $200 million in room to add one of the industry’s most profitable and stable small cap value funds to your portfolio.

Northern Global Tactical Asset Allocation (BBALX), update: this formerly mild-mannered balanced fund is maturing into a fascinating competitor to Vanguard’s splendid STAR (VGSTX) fund. The difference may come down to Northern’s greater flexibility and reliance on (gasp!) index funds.

The Best of the Web

Our friend and collaborator, Junior Yearwood, is working to manage a chronic medical condition.  He won’t, for just a bit, we hope, be able to contribute to the Observer.  While he’s gone we’ll keep his “Best of” feature on hiatus. I wish Junior a swift recovery and encourage folks who haven’t done so to find our picks for best retirement income calculator, best financial news site, best small fund website and more at Best of the Web.

Launch Alert: Manning & Napier Strategic Income funds

Manning & Napier launched Strategic Income Conservative (MSCBX) and Strategic Income Moderate (MSMSX) on August 2, 2012.  They both combine shares of four other Manning & Napier funds (Core Bond (EXCRX), Dividend Focus (MNDFX), High Yield Bond (MNHYX) and Real Estate (MNRIX) in pursuit of income, growth, and risk management. Conservative will hold 15-45% in Dividend Focus and Real Estate while Moderate will hold 45-75%. Both have low investment minimums, reasonable fees and Manning’s very steady management team.

Launch Alert: William Blair International Leaders

William Blair & Company launched William Blair International Leaders Fund (WILNX) on August 16. The fund is managed by George Greig, who has an outstanding 25 year record and two very solid funds (International Growth WBIGX and Global Growth WGGNX) and Ken McAtamney, who is being elevated from the analyst ranks. The new fund will invest in “foreign companies with above-average returns on equity, strong balance sheets, and consistent, above-average earnings growth, resulting in a focused portfolio of leading companies.”  That’s an admirably Granthamite goal. $5000 investment minimum, reduced to $1000 for accounts with an automatic investing provision.  The expense ratio will be 1.45% after waivers. Grieg’s record is very strong and his main fund closed to new investors in June, so we’re putting WILNX on the Observer’s watch-list for a profile.

RiverPark Short-Term High Yield conference call

There are few funds to have stirred more conversation, or engendered more misunderstanding, than RiverPark Short-Term High Yield (RPHYX). It’s a remarkably stable, profitable cash management fund whose name throws off lots of folks.

Manager David Sherman of Cohanzick Asset Management and RiverPark’s president, Morty Schaja, have generously agreed to participate in a conference call with Observer readers. I’ll moderate the call and David will field questions on the fund’s strategies and prospects. The call is September 13 at 7:00 p.m., Eastern.

You can register for the conference by navigating to  http://services.choruscall.com/diamondpass/registration?confirmationNumber=10017662 and following the prompts.  If you’ve got questions, feel free to write me or post a query on the discussion board.

The Observer in the News

I briefly interrupted my August vacation to answer a polite question from the investing editor of U.S. News with a rant.

The question: “what should an investor do when his or her fund manager quits?”

The rant: “in 90% of the cases, nothing.”

Why?  Because, in most instances, your fund manager simply doesn’t much matter.  Some very fine funds are led by management teams (Manning & Napier, Dodge & Cox) and some fund firms have such strong and intentional corporate cultures (T. Rowe Price) that new managers mostly repeat the success of their predecessors.  Most funds, and most larger funds in particular, are managed with an eye to unobjectionable mediocrity.  The firm’s incentive is to gather and keep assets, not to be bold.  As a result, managers are expected to avoid the sorts of strategies that risk landing them outside of the pack.

There are, however, some funds where the manager makes a huge difference.  Those are often smaller, newer, boutique funds where management decisions are driven by ideas more compelling than “keep our institutional clients quiet.”  You can read the whole story in “What to Do When Your Fund Manager Quits,” US News, August 6, 2012.

If you’ve ever read the Observer and (understandably) wondered “who is this loon and what is he up to?” there’s a reasonable article written by a young local reporter about the Observer and me.  It’s a fairly wide-ranging discussion and includes pictures that led my departmental colleagues to begin a picture captioning contest.  Anya and Chip both weigh in. “Augustana professor attracts international attention with investment site,” Rock Island Argus and Moline Dispatch, August 20, 2012.

Briefly Noted . . .

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Effective September 4, 2012, The Brown Capital Management Small Company Fund (BCSIX) will re-open for investment to all investors. Morningstar designates this as one of the Gold small-growth funds. Its returns are in the top 10% of its peer group for the past 5, 10 and 15 years. It strikes me as a bit bulky at $1.4 billion but it continues to perform. Average expenses, $5000 minimum, low turnover. (Special thanks to “The Shadow” for posting to the discussion board word of the Brown and ARIVX re-openings.  S/he is so quick at finding this stuff that it’s scary.)

Jake Mortell of Candlewood Advisory writes to say that “One of the funds I am working with, The Versus Capital Multimanager Real Estate Income Fund (VCMRX) is reducing fees on the first $25 million in assets into the fund as a risk offset to early adopters. The waiver reduces fees from 95 bps to 50 bps on the first $25 million in assets to the fund for a period of 12 months.”  It’s a closed-end fund managed by Callan Associates, famed for the Callan Periodic Table of Investment Returns.

CLOSINGS

Invesco Van Kampen High Yield Municipal (ACTHX) will close on September 4, 2012. The fund is huge ($7 billion), good (pretty consistently in the top 25% of its peer group over longer periods) and has been closed before.

Touchstone Small Cap Core Fund (TSFAX) will close to new investments on September 21, 2012. It’s an entirely decent fund that has drawn almost $500 million in under three years.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

In November, two perfectly respectable AllianceBernstein funds get rechristened. AllianceBernstein Small/Mid Cap Growth (CHCLX) becomes AllianceBernstein Discovery Growth while AllianceBernstein Small/Mid Cap Value (ABASX) will change to AllianceBernstein Discovery Value.  Same managers, same mandate, different marketing.

AllianceBernstein Balanced Shares (CABNX) becomes AllianceBernstein Global Risk Allocation on Oct. 8, 2012. New managers and a new mandate (more global allocating will go on) follow.

Artio is changing Artio Global Equity’s (BJGQX) name to Artio Select Opportunities.

BlackRock Emerging Market Debt (BEDIX) will change its name to BlackRock Emerging Market Local Debt on Sept. 3, 2012. The fund also picked up a new management team (Sergio Trigo Paz, Raphael Marechal, and Laurent Develay), all of whom are new to BlackRock. .

In mid-August, Pax World Global Green Fund became Pax World Global Environmental Markets Fund (PGRNX, “pea green”?  Hmmm…). It also became almost impossible to find at Morningstar. Search “Pax World” and you find nothing. The necessary abbreviation is “Pax Wld Glbl.” While it might be a nice idea, the fund has yet to generate the returns needed to validate its focus.

I failed to mention that PineBridge US Micro Cap Growth Fund became the Jacob Micro Cap Growth Fund (JMCGX). With the same management in place, it seems likely that the fund will continue to pursue the same high expense, high risk strategy that’s handicapped it for the past decade.

WisdomTree International Hedged Equity ETF became WisdomTree Europe Hedged Equity Fund (HEDJ – “hedge,” get it?) at the end of August. The argument is that if you hedge out the effects of the collapsing euro, there are some “export-driven European-based firms that pay dividends” which are great businesses selling at compelling valuations. The valuations are compelling, in part, because so many investors are (rightly) spooked by the euro and euro-zone financial stocks. Hedge one, avoid the other, et voila!

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

John Houseman, Smith Barney spokesperson.

Smith Barney passed away at age 75. Morgan Stanley is dropping the name from its brokerage unit in favor of Morgan Stanley Wealth Management. The Smith (1892) and Barney (1873) brokerages merged in 1938, with the resulting firm operating under a half dozen different monikers over the years. Investors of a certain age associate Smith Barney primarily with John Houseman, the actor who served as their spokesman (“They make money the old-fashioned way. They earn it”) in the late 1970s and 1980s. The change is effective this month.

SmartMoney, the magazine, is no more. Originally (1992) a joint venture between Hearst and Dow-Jones, Dow bought Heart’s take in the magazine in 2010. The final print issue, September 2012, went on newsstands on August 14. In one of those fine bits of bloodless corporate rhetoric, Dow-Jones admitted that “[a]pproximately 25 staff positions for the print edition are being impacted.”  “Impacted.”  Uh… eliminated. Subscribers have the option of picking up The Wall Street Journal or, in my case, Barron’s.

American Independence is liquidating its Nestegg series of target-date funds. The five funds will close at the end of August and cease operations at the end of September 2012. They’re the fourth firm (after Columbia, Goldman Sachs and Oppenheimer) to abandon the niche this summer.

BMO plans to liquidate BMO Large-Cap Focus (MLIFX).

In what surely qualifies as a “small win” for investors, Direxion is liquidating its nine triple-leveraged ETFs (for example, Direxion Daily BRIC Bear 3X Shares BRIS) by mid-September.

Dreyfus plans to merge Dreyfus/Standish Fixed Income (SDFIX) into Dreyfus Intermediate-Term Income (DRITX) in January 2013. Same manager on both.

DWS Clean Technology (WRMAX) is liquidating in September 2012.

FocusShares announced plans to close and liquidate its entire lineup of 15 exchange-traded funds, all of which have minimal asset levels. The Scottrade subsidiary, which launched its ETFs last year, cited current market conditions, the funds’ inability to draw assets and their future viability, as well as prospects for growth in the ETFs’ assets, for the closing.

Guggenheim Long Short Equity (RYJJX) and Guggenheim All Cap Value (SESAX) are both slated for liquidation. Apparently the Long-Short managers screwed up:

Due to unfavorable market conditions, the Long Short Equity Strategy Fund (the “Fund”) has assumed a defensive investment position in an effort to protect the current value of the Fund. While the Fund is invested in this manner, it does not invest in accordance with certain of its investment policies, including its investment policy to invest, under normal circumstances, at least 80% of its net assets, plus any borrowings for investment purposes, in equity securities, and/or derivatives thereof.

With no assets, terrible returns and a portfolio turnover rate approaching 1000%, one hardly needed additional reasons to close the fund. All Cap Value is going just because it was tiny and bad.

Jones Villalta Opportunity Fund (JVOFX), managed by Messrs Jones and Villalta, is being liquidated on September 21. The fund had a great 2009 and a really good 2010, followed by miserable performance in 2011 and 2012. It never gained any market traction and the management finally gave up.

Marsico Emerging Markets (MERGX) will be liquidated on September 21, 2012. The fund, less than two years old, had a rotten 2011 and a mediocre 2012. One of its two managers, Joshua Rubin, resigned in July. Frankly, the larger factor might be that Marsico is in crisis and they simply couldn’t afford to deal with this dud in the midst of their other struggles. Star managers Doug Rao and Cory Gilchrist have both left in the past 12 months, leaving an awfully thin bench.

Nuveen Large Cap Value (FASKX) will likely merge into Nuveen Dividend Value (FFEIX) in October 2012. Nuveen Large Cap Value’s assets have dwindled to less than $140 million after several years of steady outflows. The move also makes sense as both funds are run by the same management team. Owners of Nuveen Large Cap Value should expect to see fees drop by 5 basis points as a result of the merger.

The Profit Opportunity (PROFX) fund has closed and will be liquidated by the end of September.  It was minuscule (around $300,000), young (under two years) and inexplicably bad. PROFX is a small cap fund run by Eugene Profit, whose other small cap fund (Profit PVALX) is small but entirely first-rate. Odd disconnect.

Russell Investments is shutting down all 25 of its passively managed funds, with a combined total of over $310 million. The one ETF that will remain in operation is the Russell Equity ETF (ONEF) with $4.2 million in AUM. The shutdown will take place over the middle two weeks of October.

About the same time, Russell U.S. Value Fund (RSVIX) is merging in Russell U.S. Defensive Equity Fund (REQAX). They’re both closet index funds (R-squared of about 99) with mediocre records. The key difference is that REQAX is a large and reasonably profitable mediocre, closet-index fund.  RSVIX was not.

Sterling Capital Management has filed to liquidate the Sterling Capital National Tax-Free Money Market, Sterling Capital Prime Money Market Fund, and Sterling Capital U.S. Treasury Money Market Fund. The funds will be liquidated on December 14, 2012.

Touchstone Intermediate Fixed Income (TCFIX) has been liquidated after poor performance led to the departure of a major shareholder.

In Closing . . .

Each month we highlight changes in the fund world that you might not otherwise notice. This month we’ve found a near-record 69 fund manager changes. In addition, there are 10 new funds in registration with the SEC. They are not yet available for sale but knowing about them (say, for example, Wasatch’s new focused Emerging Markets fund) might help your planning. Most will come on the market by Thanksgiving.

In about a week the discussion board is undergoing a major software upgrade.  Chip and Accipiter have built some cool new functions into the latest version of Vanilla.  Chip highlights these:

  1. There’s an add-on that will let folks more easily format their posts: a hyperlink function (much requested) and easy images are part of it;
  2. A polling add-on that will allow us to quickly survey members;
  3. Enhancements to the administration of the discussion board;
  4. Pop up alerts, that you can choose to enable or disable, to notify you when certain content is updated or posts are responded to; and most importantly
  5. We’ll be able to take advantage of some of cool add-ons that Accipiter’s been working over the past months.

We might be offline for a couple hours, but we’ll post a notice of the exact time well in advance.

I’m often amazed at what goes on over there, by the way. There have been over 2.5 million pageviews and 3300 discussions launched. That’s made possible by a combination of the wit and generosity of the posters and the amazing work that Chip and Accipiter have done in programming and reprogramming the board to make it ever more responsive to folks’ needs (and now to Old Joe’s willingness to turn his considerable talents as a technical writer to the production of a User’s Guide for newcomers). Quiet thanks to you all.

Following from the enthusiasm of the folks on our discussion board, we’re scheduled to profile T. Rowe Price Real Assets PRAFX (waves to Polina! It’s sort of a “meh” fund but is looking like our best no-load option), Artisan Global Equity ARTHX (“hey, Investor.  I’ve been putting this one off because I was starting to feel like a shill for Artisan. They’ve earned the respect, but still …”) and the Whitebox funds (subject of a Barron’s profile and three separate discussion threads. Following our conversation with David Sherman at Cohanzick, we have an update of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) in the works and owe one for the splendid, rapidly growing RiverPark Wedgewood Growth (RPGFX) fund.

The following announcement is brought to you by Investor, a senior member of the Observer’s discussion community:

And speaking of fall, it’s back-to-school shopping time! If you’re planning to do some or all of your b-t-s shopping online, please remember to Use the Observer’s link to Amazon.com. It’s quick, painless and generates the revenue (equal to about 6% of the value of your purchases) that helps keep the Observer going.

My theory is that if I keep busy enough, I won’t notice either the daily insanity of the market or what happens next to the Steelers’ increasingly fragile O-line.

We’ll look for you then,

September 2012, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

Congress All Cap Opportunity Fund

Congress All Cap Opportunity Fund will seek long term capital appreciation by, uh, buying stocks.  All Cap stocks. “The Fund’s investment premise is that market inefficiencies exist between fixed income and equity valuations which, if properly identified, can lead to investment opportunities which can be exploited.” One would think that their “investment premise” might lead them to be able to invest in either stocks or bonds (a la FPA Crescent) but no. They’ll mostly buy U.S. stocks, with a cap of 10% on international securities, although they may derive international exposure through other holdings. The investment minimum is $2000. The managers are Daniel Lagan and Peter Andersen, both employees of Congress Asset Management Company. Neither has experience in managing a mutual fund, but their private account composite ($30 million against their firm’s total AUM of $7 billion) has outperformed the all-stock Russell 3000 index for the past 1, 3, and 5 years. The expense ratio is 1% after a substantial waiver. There’s also a 1% redemption fee.

Congress Mid Cap Growth Fund

Congress Mid Cap Growth Fund will pursue growth by investing in U.S. midcap stocks. They define mid-caps as capitalizations between $1-5 billion. The plan is to invest in companies that “are experiencing or will experience earnings growth.” For reasons unclear to me, they limit their international investments to 10% of the portfolio. The managers are Daniel Lagan and Todd Solomon, both employees of Congress Asset Management Company. Neither has experience in managing a mutual fund, but their private account composite (also $30 million against their fund’s total AUM of $7 billion) has outperformed the Russell Mid-Cap Growth index for the past 1, 3, 5 and 10 years. The investment minimum is $2000. The expense ratio is 1% after a substantial waiver. There’s also a 1% redemption fee.

Drexel Hamilton Multi-Asset Real Return Fund

Drexel Hamilton Multi-Asset Real Return Fund will pursue total return, which is to say “returns that exceeds U.S. inflation over a full inflation cycle, which is typically 5 years.”  The fund will invest globally in both securities (including REITs) and other funds (including ETNs and ETFs).   It will mostly invest in other Drexel Hamilton funds, but also in TIPs and commodity-linked ETFs.  Moving a bit further in hedge fund land, they’ll also hedge “to help manage interest rate exposure, protect Fund assets or enhance returns.”   And, too, in “response to adverse market, economic or political conditions, or when the Adviser believes that market or economic conditions are unfavorable,” they may go to cash.  Andrew Bang of Drexel Hamilton will manage the fund.  Mr. Bang, a West Point graduate with an MBA from Cornell, was “a Vice President at AIG Global Investments and a Portfolio Manager in the pension group of GE Asset Management (GEAM), where he oversaw institutional clients’ investments in global and international equity portfolios in excess of $2.5 billion.”  The minimum initial investment is $5000.  The expense ratio will be 1.81% after waivers.

DMS India Bank Index Fund

DMS India Bank Index Fund will attempt to track the CNX Bank Index. The index includes the 12 largest Indian bank stocks, which comprise 90% of the market cap of the Indian bank sector. The fund will seek to own all of the stocks in the index, rather than engaging in sampling or the use of derivatives. The fund will be managed by Peter Kohli, CEO of DMS Advisors.  The minimum initial investment will be $1500. Expenses are estimated at 0.96%, with the caveat that the fund might have to pay Indian capital gains taxes in which case the expenses would be higher. If you’re really curious, details about the index are available here.

Dreman Domestic Large Cap Over-Reaction Fund

Dreman Domestic Large Cap Over-Reaction Fund will seek high total return by investing in undervalued US large cap stocks. They intend to use “quantitative screening process to identify overlooked large cap companies with low price-to-earnings ratios, solid financial strength and strong management, that are selling below their intrinsic value and that pay relatively high dividends.” The fund will be managed by a small team headed by the legendary David Dreman. The fund’s global stock sibling, Dreman Market Over-Reaction (DRAQX), has been sort of a dud. That said, Dreman is revered. The expense ratio for “A” class shares, which have a 5.75% front load, will be 1.25% after waivers. The minimum invest is $2500 with a high $1000 minimum subsequent investment.

ING Strategic Income

ING Strategic Income “A” class shares, will seek “a high level of current income,” and perhaps a bit of capital growth. It will be a fund of income-oriented funds. They will have asset allocation targets, to which the managers make tactical adjustments.  They do not, however, seem to reveal what those targets are. The fund will be managed by three ING employees (Christine Hurtsellers, Michael Mata and Matthew Toms), who previously worked for, oh, Freddie Mac, Putnam, Lehman Brothers and (the bright spot) Calamos and Northern. The minimum investment will be $1000, reduced to $250 for IRAs. It has a 2.5% front load, making it a sort of “low-load” fund. Expenses have not yet been set. Absent a disclosure of the asset allocation, publication of low expenses and access to a load-waived share class, I’m unclear on why the fund is attractive.

Jacobs | Broel Value Fund

Jacobs | Broel Value Fund will seek long-term capital appreciation. They plan a 15-20 stock portfolio, selected according to their “value-contrarian investment philosophy” (which, frankly, looks like everyone else’s). They can invest in preferred shares and convertible securities, as well as common stocks, ETFs and closed-end funds. The managers will be Peter Jacobs, President and Chief Investment Officer of Jacobs | Broel Asset Management, and Jesse Broel, their Chief Operating Officer.  Both have worked a lot with the Ragen MacKenzie division of Wells Fargo. Neither seems to have experience in running a mutual fund.  $5000 investment minimum, reduced to $1000 for tax-advantaged accounts and those with AIPs. The expense ratio will be 1.48% and there will be a 2% redemption fee.

Matisse Discounted Closed-End Fund Strategy

Matisse Discounted Closed-End Fund Strategy will pursue long-term capital appreciation and income through buying “closed-end funds which pay regular periodic cash distributions, the interests of which typically trade at substantial discounts relative to their underlying net asset values.” They intend to be “globally balanced” and to hold 30-90 closed-end funds. The managers will be Bryn Torkelson, Eric Boughton, and Gavin Morton of Deschutes Portfolio Strategies, LLC.  Mr. Torkelson is their founder and Chief Investment Officer. In an interesting twist, the prospectus directly compares their separate account composite to the performance of RiverNorth Core Opportunity (RNCOX) and several other CEF-focused mutual funds. They modestly outperform RNCOX until you add in their management fees, which the performance table excludes.  Then they modestly trail RNCOX. The minimum initial investment will be $1000. The projected expense ratio is 2.68% after waivers.  There’s also a 2% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 60 days.

SPDR SSgA Ultra Short Term Bond, Conservative Ultra Short Term Bond and Aggressive Ultra Short Term Bond

SPDR SSgA Ultra Short Term Bond, Conservative Ultra Short Term Bond  and Aggressive Ultra Short Term Bond will be three actively-managed ETFs. Each seeks to produce “income consistent with preservation of capital through short duration high quality investments” but they do so with slightly different degrees of aggressiveness. Tom Connelley and Maria Pino, both Vice Presidents of SSgA FM and Senior Portfolio Managers for their U.S. Cash Management group, will manage the funds. The expenses have not yet been announced and, being ETFs, there is no investment minimum.

Wasatch Emerging Markets Select

Wasatch Emerging Markets Select fund will pursue long term growth. It will be an all-cap fund holding 30-50 stocks, and the prospectus describes it as non-diversified. The managers will be Ajay Krishnan, who also manages Ultra Growth, Emerging India and Global Opportunities, and Roger Edgly, who manages International Growth, International Opportunities, Emerging Markets Small Cap, Global Opportunities and Emerging India. (Overstretched, one wonders). The initial minimum purchase is $2000 for regular and IRA accounts, $1000 for accounts with AIPs and Coverdell Education Savings Accounts. The expenses have not yet been set. There will be a 2% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 60 days.

August 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to the Summer Break edition of the Mutual Fund Observer. I’m writing from idyllic Ephraim, Wisconsin, a beautiful little village in Door County on the shores of Green Bay. Here’s a quick visual representation of how things are going:

Thanks to Kathy Glasnap, a very talented artist who has done some beautiful watercolors of Door County, for permission to use part of one of her paintings (“All in a Row”). Whether or not you’ve (yet) visited the area, you should visit her gallery online at http://www.glasnapgallery.com/

Chip, Anya, Junior and I bestirred ourselves just long enough to get up, hit <send>, refill our glasses with sangria and settle back into a stack of beach reading and a long round of “Mutual Fund Truth or Dare.”  (Don’t ask.)

In celebration of the proper activities of summer (see above), we offer an abbreviated Observer.

MFO in Other Media: David on Chuck Jaffe’s MoneyLife Radio Show

I’ll be the first to admit it: I have a face made for radio and a voice made for print.  Nonetheless, I was pleased to make an appearance on Chuck Jaffe’s MoneyLife radio show (which is also available as a podcast).  I spoke about three of the funds that we profiled this month, and then participated in a sort of “stump the chump” round in which I was asked to offer quick-hit opinions in response to listener questions.

Dodge & Cox Global Stock (DODWX) for Rick in York, Pa.  It’s easy to dismiss DODWX if you’ve give a superficial glance at its performance.  The fund cratered immediately after launch in 2008 when the managers bought financial stocks that were selling at a once-in-a-generation price only to see them fall to a once-in-a-half-century price.  But those purchases set up a ferocious run in 2009.  It was hurt in 2011 by an oversized emerging markets stake which paid off handsomely in the first quarter of 2012.  It’s got a great management team and an entirely sensible investment discipline.  It’ll be out-of-step often enough but will, in the long run, be a really good investment.

Fidelity Emerging Markets (FEMKX) for Brad in Cazenovia, NY.  My bottom line was “it’s not as bad as it used to be, but there’s still no compelling reason to own it.”  If you’re investing with Fido, their new Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX) is a more much intriguing option.

Leuthold Core Investment (LCORX) for Scott in Redmond, Ore. This was the original go-anywhere fund, born of Leuthold’s sophisticated market analysis service.  Quant driven, quite capable of owning pallets of lead or palladium.  Brilliant for years but, like many computer-driven funds, largely hamstrung lately by the market’s irrational jerks and twitches.  If you anticipate a return to a more-or-less “normal” market where returns aren’t driven by fears of the Greeks, it’s likely to resume being an awfully attractive, conservative holding.

Matthews Asia Dividend Fund (MAPIX) for Robert in Steubenville, Ohio.  With Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), this fund has the best risk-return profile of any Asian-focused fund.  The manager invests in strong companies with lots of free cash flow and a public commitment to their dividend.  What it lacks in MACSX’s bond and convertibles holdings, it makes up for in good country selection and stock picking.  If you want to invest in Asia, Matthews is the place to start.

T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX) for Dennis in Strongsville, Ohio. PRWCX usually holds about 65% of the portfolio in large, domestic dividend-paying stocks and a third in other income-producing securities.  Traditionally the fund held a lot of convertible securities though David Giroux, manager since 2006, has held a bit more stock and fewer converts.  The fund has lost money once in a quarter century and a former manager chuckled over the recollection that Price’s internal allocation models kept coming to the same conclusion: “invest 100% in PRWCX.”

MFO in Other Media: David on “The Best Fund for the Next Six Months … and Beyond”

Early in July, John Waggoner wrote to ask for recommendations for “the remainder of 2012.”  Answers from three “mutual fund experts” (I shudder) appear in John’s July 5th column.  Dan Wiener tabbed PrimeCap Odyssey Aggressive Growth (POAGX) and Jim Lowell picked Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX).  I highlighted the two most recent additions to my non-retirement portfolio:

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX), which I described as “one of the most misunderstood funds I cover. It functions as a cash management fund for me — 3% to 4% returns with (so far) negligible volatility. Its greatest problem is its name, which suggests that it invests in short-term, high-yield bonds (which, in general, it doesn’t) or that it has the risk profile of a high-yield fund (ditto).”

David Sherman, the manager, stresses that RPHYX “is not an ATM machine.”  That said, the fund returned 2.6% in the first seven months of 2012 with negligible volatility (the NAV mostly just drops with the month-end payouts).  That’s led to a Sharpe ratio above 3, which is simply great.  Mr. Sherman says that he thinks of it as a superior alternative to, say, laddered bonds or CDs.  While in a “normal” bond market this will underperform a diversified fund with longer durations, in a volatile market it might well outperform the vast majority.

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX), driven by the fact that Mr. Foster “performed brilliantly at Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), which was the least volatile (hence most profitable) Asian fund for years. With Seafarer, he’s able to sort of hedge a MACSX-like portfolio with limited exposure to non-Asian emerging markets. The strategy makes sense, and Mr. Foster has proven able to consistently execute it.”

SFGIX has substantially outperformed the average emerging-Asia, Latin America and diversified emerging markets fund in the months since its launch, though it trails MACSX.  The folks on our discussion board mostly maintain a “deserves to be on the watch-list” stance, based mostly on MACSX’s continued excellence.  I’m persuaded by Mr. Foster’s argument on behalf of a portfolio that’s still Asia-centered but not Asia exclusively.

Seafarer Overseas Piques Morningstar’s Interest

One of Morningstar’s most senior analysts, Gregg Wolper, examined the struggles of two funds that should be attracting more investor interest than they are, in “Two Young Funds Struggle to Get Noticed” (July 31, 2012).

One is TCW International Small Cap (TGICX) which launched in March 2011.  It’s an international small-growth fund managed by Rohit Sah.  Sah had “an impressive if volatile record” in seven years at Oppenheimer International Small Company (OSMAX).  The problem is that Sah has a high-volatility strategy even by the standards of a high-volatility niche, which isn’t really in-tune with current investor sentiment.  Its early record is mostly negative which isn’t entirely surprising.  No load, $2000 investment minimum, 1.44% expense ratio.

The other is Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income (SFGIX).  Wolper recognizes Mr. Foster’s “impressive record” at Matthews and his risk-conscious approach to emerging markets investing.  “His fund tries to cushion the risks of emerging-markets investing by owning less-volatile, dividend-paying stocks and through other means, and in fact over the past three months it has suffered a much more moderate loss than the average diversified emerging-markets fund.”  Actually, from inception through July 31 2012, Seafarer was up by 0.4% while the average emerging markets fund had lost 7.4%.

Mr. Wolper concludes that when investors’ appetite for risk returns, these will both be funds to watch:

At some point, though, certain investors will be looking for a bold fund to fill a small slot in their portfolio. Funds with modest asset bases have more flexibility than their more-popular rivals to own smaller, less-liquid stocks in less-traveled markets should they so choose. For that reason, it’s worth keeping these offerings in mind. Their managers are accomplished, and though there are caveats with each, including their cost, they feature strategies that are not easy to find at rival choices.

It’s What Makes Yahoo, Yahoo

Archaic, on the Observer’s discussion board, complained, “When I use Yahoo Finance to look at a particular fund … [its] Annual Total Return History, the history is complete through 2010 but ends there. No 2011. Anyone know why?”

The short answer is: because it’s Yahool.  This is a problem that Yahoo has known about for months, but has been either unable or unmotivated to correct.  Here’s their “Help” page on the problem:

I added a large arrow only because I don’t know how to add either a flashing one or an animated GIF of a guy slapping himself on the forehead.  Yahoo has known about this problem for at least three months without correcting it.

Note to Marissa Mayer, Yahoo’s new CEO: Yahoo describes itself as “a company that helps consumers find what they are looking for and discover wonders they didn’t expect.”  In this case, we’re looking for 2011 data and the thing we wonder about is what it says about Yahoo’s corporate culture and competence.  Perhaps you might check with the folks at Morningstar for an example of how quickly and effectively a first-rate organization identifies, addresses and corrects problems like this.

Too Soon Gone: Eric Bokota and FPA International Value (FPIVX)

I had the pleasure of a long conversation with Eric Bokota at the Morningstar Investment Conference in June.  I was saddened to hear that events in his private life have obliged him to resign from FPA.  The FPA folks seemed both deeply saddened and hopeful that one day he’ll return.  I wish him Godspeed.

Four Funds That Are Really Worth Your Time (even in summer!)

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features three newer funds and an update ING Corporate Leaders, a former “Star in the Shadows” whose ghostly charms have attracted a sudden rush of assets.

FPA International Value (FPIVX): led by Oakmark alumnus Pierre Py, FPA’s first new fund in almost 30 years has the orientation, focus, discipline and values to match FPA’s distinguished brand.

ING Corporate Leaders Trust (LEXCX): the ghost ship of the fund world sails into its 78th year, skipperless and peerless.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX): RiverPark’s successful hedge, now led by a guy who’s been getting it consistently right for almost two decades, is now available for the rest of us.

The Cook and Bynum Fund (COBYX): you think your fund is focused?  Feh! You don’t know focused until you’ve met Messrs. Cook and Bynum.

The Best Small Fund Websites: Seafarer and Cook & Bynum

The folks at the Observer visit scores of fund company websites each month and it’s hard to avoid the recognition that most of them are pretty mediocre.  The worst of them post as little content as possible, updated as rarely as possible, signaling the manager’s complete disdain for the needs and concerns of his (and very rarely, her) investors.

Small fund companies can’t afford such carelessness; their prime distinction from the industry’s bloated household names is their claim to a different and better relationship with their investors.  If investors are going to win the struggle against the overwhelming urge to buy high and leave in a panic, they need a rich website and need to use it.  If they can build a relationship of trust and understanding with their managers, they’ve got a much better chance of holding through rough stretches and profiting from rich ones.

This month, Junior and I enlisted the aid of two immensely talented web designers to help us analyze three dozen small fund websites in order to find and explain the best of them.  One expert is Anya Zolotusky, designer of the Observer’s site and likely star of a series of “Most Interesting Woman in the World” sangria commercials.  The other is Nina Eisenman, president of Eisenman Associates and founder of FundSites, a firm which helps small to mid-sized fund companies design distinctive and effective websites.

If you’re interested in why Seafarer and Cook & Bynum are the web’s best small company sites, and which twelve earned “honorable mention” or “best of the rest” recognition, the entrance is here!

Launch Alert: RiverNorth and Manning & Napier, P. B. and Chocolate

Two really good fund managers are combining forces.  RiverNorth/Manning & Napier Dividend Income (RNMNX) launched on July 18th.  The fund is a hybrid of two highly-successful strategies: RiverNorth’s tactical allocation strategy based, in part, on closed-end fund arbitrage, and Manning & Napier’s largely-passive dividend focus strategy.  Both are embedded in freestanding funds, though the RiverNorth fund is closed to new investors.  There’s a lively discussion of the fund and, in particular, whether it offers any distinct value, on our discussion board.  The minimum investment is $5000 and we’re likely to profile the fund in October.

Briefly Noted . . .

As a matter of ongoing disclosure about such things, I want to report several changes in my personal portfolio that touch on funds we’ve profiled or will soon profile.  In my non-retirement portfolio, I sold off part of my holdings of Matthews Asian Growth and Income (MACSX) and invested the proceeds in Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX).  As with all my non-retirement funds, I’ve established an automatic investment plan in Seafarer.  In my retirement accounts, I sold my entire position in Fidelity Diversified International (FDIVX) and Canada (FICDX) and invested the proceeds in a combination of Global Balanced (FGBLX) and Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX).  FDIVX has gotten too big and too index-like to justify inclusion and Canada’s new-ish manager is staggering around, and I’m hopeful that the e.m. exposure in the other two funds will be a significant driver while the fixed-income components offer some cushion.  Finally, also in my retirement accounts, I sold T. Rowe Price New Era (PRENX) and portions of two other funds to buy Real Assets Fund (PRAFX).  What can I say?  Jeremy Grantham is very persuasive.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

A bunch of funds have tried to boost their competitiveness by cutting expenses or at least waiving a portion of them.

Cohen & Steers Dividend Value (DVFAX) will limit fund expenses to 1.00% for A shares through June 2014.

J.P. Morgan announced 9 basis point cuts for JP Morgan US Dynamic Plus (JPSAX) and JP Morgan US Large Cap Core Plus (JLCAX).

Legg Mason capped expenses on Legg Mason BW Diversified Large Cap Value (LBWAX) at between 0.85% – 1.85%, depending on share class.

Madison Investment Advisors cuts fees on Madison Mosaic Investors (MINVX) by 4 bps, Madison Mosaic Mid Cap (GTSGX) by 10, and Madison Mosaic Dividend Income (BHBFX, formerly Balanced) by 30.

Managers is dropping fees for Managers Global Income Opportunity (MGGBX), Managers Real Estate Securities (MRESX), and Managers AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced (MBEAX) by 11 – 16 bps.

Alger Small Cap Growth (ALSAX) and its institutional brother reopened to new investors on Aug. 1, 2012.  It was once a really solid fund but it’s been sagging in recent years so your ability to get into it really does qualify as a “small win.”

CLOSINGS

Columbia Small Cap Value (CSMIX) has closed to new investors. For those interested, The Wall Street Journal publishes a complete closed fund list each month.  It’s available online with the almost-poetic name, Table of Mutual Funds Closed to New Investors.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Just as a reminder, the distinguished no-load Marketfield (MFLDX) will become the load-bearing MainStay Marketfield Fund on Oct. 5, 2012.  The Observer profile of Marketfield appeared in July.

At the end of September, Lord Abbett Capital Structure (LAMAX), a billion dollar hybrid fund, will be relaunched as Lord Abbett Calibrated Dividend Growth, with a focus on dividend-paying stocks and new managers: Walter Prahl and Rick Ruvkun.  No word about why.

Invesco announced it will cease using the Van Kampen name on its funds in September.  By way of example, Invesco Van Kampen American Franchise “A” (VAFAX) will simply be Invesco American Franchise “A”.

Oppenheimer Funds is buying and renaming the five SteelPath funds, all of which invest in master limited partnerships and all of which have sales loads.  There was a back door into the fund, which allowed investors to buy them without a load, but that’s likely to close.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

BlackRock is merging its S&P 500 Index (MDSRX) and Index Equity (PNIEX) funds into BlackRock S&P 500 Stock (WFSPX).  And no, I have no idea of what sense it made to run all three funds in the first place.

DWS Clean Technology (WRMAX) will be liquidated in October 2012.

Several MassMutual funds (Strategic Balanced, Value Equity, Core Opportunities, and Large Cap Growth) were killed-off in June 2012.

Oppenheimer is killing off their entry into the retirement-date fund universe by merging their regrettable Transition Target-Date into their regrettable static allocation hybrid funds.  Oppenheimer Transition 2030 (OTHAX), 2040 (OTIAX), and 2050 (OTKAX) will merge into Active Allocation (OAAAX). The shorter time-frame Transition 2015 (OTFAX), 2020 (OTWAX), and 2025 (OTDAX) will merge into Moderate Investor (OAMIX).  Transition 2010 (OTTAX) will, uhhh … transition into Conservative Investor (OACIX). The same management team oversaw or oversees the whole bunch.

Goldman Sachs took the easier way out and announced the simple liquidation of its entire Retirement Strategy lineup.  The funds have already closed to new investors but Goldman hasn’t yet set a date for the liquidation.   It’s devilishly difficult to compete with Fidelity, Price and Vanguard in this space – they’ve got good, low-cost products backed up by sophisticated allocation modeling.  As a result they control about three-quarters of the retirement/target-date fund universe.  If you start with that hurdle and add mediocre funds to the mix, as Oppenheimer and Goldman did, you’re somewhere between “corpse” and “zombie.”

Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity II (TFEMX), a perfectly respectable performer with few assets, is merging into Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity (TEMAX). Same management team, similar strategies.

In a “scraping their name off the door” move, ASTON has removed M.D. Sass Investors Services as a subadvisor to ASTON/MD Sass Enhanced Equity (AMBEX). Anchor Capital Advisors, which was the other subadvisor all along, now gets its name on the door at ASTON/Anchor Capital Enhanced Equity.

Destra seems already to have killed off Destra Next Dimension (DLGSX), a tiny global stock fund managed by Roger Ibbotson.

YieldQuest Total Return Bond (YQTRX), one of the first funds I profiled as an analyst for FundAlarm, has finally ceased operations.  (P.S., it was regrettable even six years ago.)

In Closing . . .

Some small celebrations and reminders.  This month the Observer passed its millionth pageview on the main site with well over two million additional pageviews on our endlessly engaging discussion board (hi, guys!).  We’re hopeful of seeing our 100,000th new reader this fall.

Speaking of the discussion board, please remember that registration for participating in the board is entirely separate from registering to receive our monthly email reminder.  Signing up for board membership, a necessary safeguard against increasingly agile spambots, does not automatically get you on the email list and vice versa.

And speaking of fall, it’s back-to-school shopping time!  If you’re planning to do some or all of your b-t-s shopping online, please remember to Use the Observer’s link to Amazon.com.  It’s quick, painless and generates the revenue (equal to about 6% of the value of your purchases) that helps keep the Observer going.  Once you click on the link, you may want to bookmark it so that your future Amazon purchases are automatically and invisibly credited to the Observer. Heck, you can even share the link with your brother-in-law.

A shopping lead for the compulsive-obsessive among you: How to Sharpen Pencils: A Practical & Theoretical Treatise on the Artisanal Craft of Pencil Sharpening for Writers, Artists, Contractors, Flange Turners, Anglesmiths, & Civil Servants (2012).  The book isn’t yet on the Times’ bestseller lists, though I don’t know why.

A shopping lead for folks who thought they’d never read poems about hedge funds: Katy Lederer’s The Heaven-Sent Leaf (2008).  Lederer’s an acclaimed poet who spent time working at, and poetrifying about, a New York hedge fund.

In September, we’ll begin looking at the question “do you really need to buy a dedicated ‘real assets’ fund?”  T. Rowe Price has incorporated one into all of their retirement funds and Jeremy Grantham is increasingly emphatic on the matter.  There’s an increasing area of fund and ETF options, including Price’s own fund which was, for years, only available to the managers of Price funds-of-funds.

We’ll look for you.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX), August 2012

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The fund pursues long-term capital appreciation while managing downside volatility by investing, long and short, primarily in U.S. stocks.  The managers describe the goal as pursuing “above average rates of return with less volatility and less downside risk as compared to U.S. equity markets.” They normally hold 40-60 long positions in stocks with “above-average growth prospects” and 40-75 short positions in stocks representing firms with challenged business models operating in declining industries.   They would typically be 50-60% net long, though their “target window” is 20-70%.  They invest in stocks of all capitalizations and can invest in non-U.S. stocks but the managers do not view that as a primary focus.

Adviser

RiverPark Advisors, LLC. Executives from Baron Asset Management, including president Morty Schaja, formed RiverPark in July 2009.  RiverPark oversees the six RiverPark funds, though other firms manage three of them.  RiverPark Capital Management runs separate accounts and partnerships.  Collectively, they have $567 million in assets under management, as of July 31, 2012.

Manager

Mitch Rubin, a Managing Partner at RiverPark and their CIO.  Mr. Rubin came to investing after graduating from Harvard Law and working in the mergers and acquisitions department of a law firm and then the research department of an investment bank.  The global perspective taken by the M&A people led to a fascination with investing and, eventually, the opportunity to manage several strategies at Baron Capital.  Rubin also manages the RiverPark Large Cap Growth Fund and co-manages Small Cap Growth.  He’s assisted by RiverPark’s CEO, Morty Schaja, and Conrad van Tienhoven, a long-time associate of his and co-manager on Small Cap Growth.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

The managers and other principals at RiverPark have invested about $4.2 million in the fund, as of July 2012.  Mr. Schaja describes it as “our favorite internal fund” and object of “the greatest net investment of our own money.”

Opening date

March 30, 2012.  The fund started life as a hedge fund on September 30, 2009 then converted to a mutual fund in March 2012.  The hedge fund’s “investment policies, objectives, guidelines and restrictions were in all material respects equivalent to the Fund’s.”

Minimum investment

$1,000.

Expense ratio

1.75% for institutional class shares and 2.00% for retail class shares, after waivers, on assets of $46.4 million, as of July 2023. 

Comments

All long-short funds have about the same goal: to provide a relatively large fraction of the stock market’s long-term gains with a relatively small fraction of its short-term volatility.  They all invest long in what they believe to be the most attractively valued stocks and invest short, that is bet against, the least attractively valued ones.  Many managers imagine their long portfolios as “offense” and their short portfolio as “defense.”

That’s the first place where RiverPark stands apart.  Mr. Rubin intends to “always play offense.”  He believes that RiverPark’s discipline will allow him to make money, “on average and over time,” on both his long and short portfolios.  Most long-short managers, observing that the stock market rises more often than it falls and that a rising market boosts even bad stocks, expect to lose money in the long-term on their short positions even while the shorts offer important protection in falling markets.

How so?  RiverPark started with the recognition that some industries are in terminal decline because of enduring, secular changes in society.  By identifying what the most important enduring changes were, the managers thought they might have a template for identifying industries likely to rise over the coming decades and those most likely to decline.  The word “decade” here is important: the managers are not trying to identify relatively short-term “macro” events (e.g., the failure of the next Eurozone bailout) that might boost or depress stocks over the next six to 18 months.  Their hope is to identify factors which are going to lift up or grind down entire industries, year after year, for as far as the eye could see.

And that establishes a second distinction for RiverPark: they’re long-term investors who have been in the industry, and have been together, long enough (17 years so far) to learn patience.  They’re quite willing to short a company like JCPenney even as other investors frantically bid up the share price over the arrival of a new management team, new marketing campaign or a new pricing scheme.  They have reason to believe that Penney “is a struggling, sunset business attempting to adapt to . . . changes” in a dying industry (big mall-based department stores).  The enthusiasm of other investors pushed Penney’s stock valuation to 40-times earnings, despite the fact that “our research with vendors, real estate professionals, and consumers has produced no evidence to indicate that any of the company’s plans were actually working.  In fact, we have seen the opposite.  The pricing strategy has proven to be confusing, the advertising to be ineffective, and the morale at the company to be poor.”

Finally, they know the trajectory of the firms they cover.  The team started in small cap investing, later added large caps and finally long-short strategies.  It means that there are firms which they researched intensively when they were in their small cap growth products, which grew into contributors in the large cap growth fund, were sold as they became mature firms with limited growth prospects, and are now shorted as they move into the sunset.   This has two consequences.  They have a tremendous amount of knowledge from which to draw; Mr. van Tienhoven notes that they have records of every trade they’ve made since 1997.  And they have no emotional attachment to their stocks; they are, they tell me, “analysts and not advocates.”  They will not overpay for stocks and they won’t hold stocks whose prospects are no longer compelling.  They been known to “work on a company for 15 years that we love but that we’ve never owned” because the valuations have never been compelling.  And they know that the stocks that once made them a great deal of money as longs may inevitably become candidates for shorting, which will allow them to again contribute to the fund’s shareholders.

All of which is fine in theory.  The question is: can they pull it off in practice?

Our best clue comes from Mr. Rubin’s long public track record.  RLSFX is his eighth fund that he’s either managed or co-managed.  Of those, seven – dating back to 1995 – have met and in many cases substantially exceeded its benchmark either during his tenure or, in the case of current funds, from inception through the end of the first quarter of 2012.  That includes five long-only products and two long-short funds. At the point of its conversion to a mutual fund, the RiverPark Opportunity Fund LLC was only half as volatile as the S&P 500 whether measured by maximum drawdown (that is, the greatest peak to trough fall), downmarket performance or worst quarter performance.  The fund returned 14.31% from inception, barely trailing the S&P’s 14.49%. The combination of the same returns with a fraction of the volatility gave the fund an outstanding Sharpe ratio: 4.2%.  He is, it’s clear, quite capable of consistently and patiently executing the strategy that he’s described.

There are a couple potential concerns which investors need to consider.

  1. The expense ratio, even after waivers, is a daunting 3.5%.  About 40% of the expenses are incurred by the fund’s short positions and so they’re beyond the manager’s immediate control.
  2. The fund’s performance after conversion to a mutual fund is more modest than its preceding performance.  The fund gained 21% in the first quarter of 2012 while still a hedge fund, smashing its peer group’s 4.8% return.  In the four months since conversion, it leads its peers by a more modest 0.8%.  Mr. Rubin is intensely competitive and intensely aware of his fund’s absolute and relative performance.  He says that nothing about the fund’s operation changed in the transition and notes that no fund outperforms every quarter in every kind of market, but “we’ve never underperformed for very long.”

Bottom Line

Mr. Rubin is an experienced professional, working on a fund that he thinks of as the culmination of the 17 years of active management, research and refinement.  Both of his long-short hedge funds offered annual returns within a few tenths of a percent of the stock market’s but did so with barely half of the volatility.   Even with the drag of substantial expenses, RLSFX has earned a place on any short-list of managed volatility equity funds.

Fund website

RiverPark Long-Short /Opportunity Fund

Fact Sheet

[cr2012]

The Cook and Bynum Fund (COBYX), August 2012

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

COBYX pursues the long-term growth of capital.  They do that by assembling an exceedingly concentrated global stock portfolio.  The stocks in the portfolio must meet four criteria.

    • Circle of Competence: they only invest in businesses “whose economics and future prospects” they can understand.
    • Business: they only invest in “wide moat” firms, those with sustainable competitive advantages.
    • People: they only invest when they believe the management team is highly competent and trustworthy.
    • Price: they only buy shares priced at a substantial discount – preferably 50% – to their estimate of the share’s true value.

Within those confines, they can invest pretty much anywhere and in any amount.

Adviser

Cook & Bynum Capital Management, LLC, an independent, employee-owned money management firm established in 2001.  The firm is headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama.  It manages COBYX and two other “pooled investment vehicles.”  As of June 30, 2012, the adviser had approximately $220 million in assets under management.

Managers

Richard P. Cook and J. Dowe Bynum.  Messrs Cook and Bynum are the principals and founding partners of Cook & Bynum (are you surprised?) and have managed the fund since its inception. They have a combined 23 years of investment management experience. Mr. Cook previously managed individual accounts for Cook & Bynum Capital Management, which also served as a subadviser to Gullane Capital Partners. Prior to that, he worked for Tudor Investment Corp. in Greenwich, CT. Mr. Bynum also managed individual accounts for Cook & Bynum. Previously, he’d worked as an equity analyst at Goldman Sachs & Co. in New York.   They work alone and also manage around $140 million in two other accounts.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

As of September 30, 2011, Mr. Cook had between $100,000 and $500,000 invested in the fund, and Mr. Bynum had over $500,000 invested.  Between these investments and their investments in the firm’s private accounts, they have “substantially all of our investable net worth” in the firm’s investment vehicles.

Opening date

July 1, 2009.  The fund is modeled on a private accounts which the team has run since August 2001.

Minimum investment

$5,000 for regular accounts and $1,000 for IRA accounts.

Expense ratio

1.88%, after waivers, on assets of $82 million.  There’s also a 2% redemption fee for shares held less than 60 days.

Comments

I can explain what Cook and Bynum do.

I can explain how they’ve done.

But I have no comfortable explanation for how they’ve done it.

Messrs. Cook and Bynum are concentrated value investors in the tradition of Buffett and Munger.  They’ve been investing since before they were teens and even tried to start a mutual fund with $200,000 in seed money while they were in college.  Within a few years after graduating college, they began managing money professionally.  Now in their mid 30s, they’re on the verge of their first Morningstar rating which might well be five stars.

Their investment discipline seems straightforward: do what Warren would do.  Focus on businesses and industries that you understand, invest only with world-class management teams, research intensely, wait for a good price, don’t over-diversify, and be willing to admit your mistakes.

They are, on face, very much like dozens of other Buffett devotees in the fund world.

Their discipline led to the construction of a very distinctive portfolio.  They’ve invested in just eight stocks (as of 3/31/12) and hold about 30% in cash.  There are simply no surprises in the list:

Company Ticker Sector

% of Total Portfolio

Wal-Mart Stores WMT General Merchandise Stores

19.0

Microsoft MSFT Software Publishers

10.8

Berkshire Hathaway BRK/B Diversified Companies

10.3

Arca Continental SAB AC* MM Soft Drink Bottling & Distribution

8.8

Coca-Cola KO Soft Drink Manufacturing

5.2

Procter & Gamble PG Household/Cosmetic Products Manufacturing

5.0

Kraft Foods KFT Snack Food Manufacturing

4.9

Tesco TSCO Supermarkets & Other Grocery Stores

4.9

American investors might be a bit unfamiliar with the fund’s two international holdings (Arca is a large Coca-Cola bottler serving Latin America and Tesco is the world’s third-largest retailer) but neither is “an undiscovered gem.”  With so few stocks, there’s little diversification by sector (70% of the fund is “consumer defensive” stocks) or size (85% are mega-caps).  Both are residues of bottom-up stock picking (that is, the stocks which best met C&B’s criteria were consumer-oriented multinationals) and are of no concern to the managers who remain agnostic about such external benchmarks. The fund’s turnover ratio is 25%, which is quite, if not stunningly, low.

Their performance has, however, been excellent.  Kiplinger’s (11/29/2011) reported on their long-term record: “Over the past ten years through October 31, 2011, a private account the duo have managed in the same way they manage the fund returned 8.7% annualized” which beat the S&P 500 by 6.4% per year.  COBYX just passed its third anniversary with a bang: its returns are in the top 1-5% of its large blend peer group for the past month, quarter, YTD, year and three years.  While the mutual fund trailed the vast majority of its peers in 2010, returning 11.8% versus 14.0% for its peers, that’s both very respectable and not unusual for a cash-heavy fund in a rallying market.  In 2011 the fund finished in the top 1% of its peer group and it was in the top 3% through the first seven months of 2012.

More to the point, the fund has (since inception) substantially outperformed Mr. Buffett’s Berkshire-Hathaway (BRK.A).  It is well ahead of other focus Buffettesque funds such as Tilson Focus (TILFX) and FAM Value (FAMVX) and while it has returns in the neighborhood of Tilson Dividend (TILDX), Yacktman (YACKX) and Yacktman Focused (YAFFX), it’s less volatile.

Having read about everything written by or about the fund and having spoken at length with David Hobbs, Cook & Bynum’s president, I’m still not sure why they do so well.  What stands out from that conversation is the insane amount of fieldwork the managers do before initiating and while monitoring a position.  By way of example, the fund invested in Wal-Mart de Mexico (Walmex) from 2007-2012.  Their interest began while they were investigating another firm (Soriana), whose management idolized Walmex.  “We visited Walmex’s management the following week in Mexico City and were blown away … Since then we have made hundreds of store visits to Walmex’s various formats as well as to Soriana’s and to those of other competitors…”  They concluded that Walmex was “perhaps the finest large company in the world” and its stock was deeply discounted.  They bought.   The Walmex position “significantly outperformed our most optimistic expectation over the last six years,” with the stock rising high enough that it no longer trades at an adequate discount so they sold it.

In talking with Mr. Hobbs, it seems that a comparable research push is taking place in emerging Europe.  While the team suspects that the Eurozone might collapse, such macro calls don’t drive their stock selection and so they’re pursuing a number of leads within the zone.  Given their belief in a focused portfolio, Hobbs concluded “if we can find two or three good ideas, it’s been a good year.”

Potential investors need to cope with three concerns.  First, a 1.88% expense ratio is high and is going to be an ongoing drag on returns.  Second, their incessant travel carries risks.  In psychology, the problem is summed up in the adage, “seek and ye shall find, whether it’s there or not.”  In acoustical engineering, it’s addressed as the “signal-to-noise ratio.”  If you were to spend three weeks of your life schlepping around central Europe, perusing every mini-mart from Bratislava to Bucharest, you’d experience tremendous internal pressure to conclude that you’d gained A Great Insight from all that effort. Third, it’s not always going to work.  For all their care and skill, someone will slip Stupid Pills into their coffee one morning.  It happened to Donald Yacktman, a phenomenally talented guy who trailed his peers badly for three consecutive years (2004-06).  It happened to Bill Nygren whose Oakmark Select (OAKLX) crushed for a decade then trailed the pack, sometimes dramatically, for five consecutive years (2003-07).  Over 30 years it happens repeatedly to Marty Whitman at Third Avenue Value (TAVFX). And it happened to a bunch of once-untouchable managers (Jim Oelschlager at White Oak Growth WOGSX, Auriana and Utsch at Kaufmann KAUFX, Ron Muhlenkamp at Muhlenkamp Fund MUHLX) whose former brilliance is now largely eclipsed.  The best managers stumble and recover.  The best focused portfolio managers stumble harder, and recover.  The best shareholders stick with them.

Bottom Line

It’s working.  Cook and Bynum might well be among the best.  They’re young.  The fund is small and nimble.  Their discipline makes great sense.  It’s not magic, but it has been very, very good and offers an intriguing alternative for investors concerned by lockstep correlations and watered-down portfolios.

Fund website

The Cook & Bynum Fund.  The C&B website was recently recognized as one of the two best small fund websites as part of the Observer’s “Best of the Web” feature.

[cr2012]

FPA International Value Fund (FPIVX) – August 2012

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

FPA International Value tries to provide above average capital appreciation over the long term while minimizing the risk of capital losses.  Their strategy is to identify high-quality companies, invest in a quite limited number of them and only when they’re selling at a substantial discount to FPA’s estimation of fair value, and then to hold on to them for the long-term.  In the absence of stocks selling at compelling discounts, FPA is willing to hold a lot of cash for an extended period.  They’re able to invest in both developed and developing markets, but recognize that the bulk of their exposure to the latter might be achieved indirectly through developed market firms with substantial emerging markets footprints.

Adviser

FPA, formerly First Pacific Advisors, which is located in Los Angeles.  The firm is entirely owned by its management which, in a singularly cool move, bought FPA from its parent company in 2006 and became independent for the first time in its 50 year history.  The firm has 25 investment professionals and 66 employees in total.  Currently, FPA manages about $20 billion across four equity strategies and one fixed income strategy.  Each strategy is manifested in a mutual fund and in separately managed accounts; for example, the Contrarian Value strategy is manifested in FPA Crescent (FPACX), in nine separate accounts and a half dozen hedge funds.

Managers

Pierre O. Py.  Mr. Py joined FPA in September 2011. Prior to that, he was an International Research Analyst for Harris Associates, adviser to the Oakmark funds, from 2005 to 2010.  At this writing (July 30 2012), Mr. Py was looking for a couple of analysts to assist in running the fund.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Py, his former co-manager Eric Bokota and FPA’s partners are the fund’s largest investors.  Mr. Bokota estimated that he and Mr. Py had invested about two to three times their annual salary in the fund.  That reflects FPA’s corporate commitment to “co-investment” in which “Partners invest alongside our clients and have a majority of their investable net worth committed to the firm’s products and investments. We encourage all other members of the firm to invest similarly.”

Opening date

December 1, 2011.

Minimum investment

$1,500, reduced to $100 for IRAs or accounts with automatic investing plans

Expense ratio

1.35% on assets of $8 million

Comments

Few fund companies get it consistently right.  By “right” I don’t mean “in step with current market passions” or “at the top of the charts every years.”  By “right” I mean two things: they have an excellent investment discipline and they treat their shareholders with profound respect.

FPA gets it consistently right.

That alone is enough to warrant a place for FPA International Value on any reasonable investor’s due diligence list.

What are the markers of getting it right?  FPA describes itself as a “absolute value investors.”  They simply refuse to buy overpriced assets, preferring instead to hold cash – even at negligible yields – rather than lowering their standards.  It’s not unusual for an FPA fund to hold 20 – 40% in cash, sometimes for several years.  That means the funds will sometimes post disastrous relative returns – for example, flagship FPA Capital (FPTTX) has trailed 98-100% of its peers three times in the past ten years – but their refusal to buy anything at frothy prices pays off handsomely for long-term investors (FPPTX has posted top-tier results for the decade as a whole).  That divergence between occasional short-term dislocations and long-term discipline leads to an interesting pattern in Morningstar ratings: while three of FPA’s four established stock funds earn just three stars (as of late July 2012), all three also earn Silver ratings which reflects the judgment of Morningstar’s analysts that these really are top-tier funds.

The fourth fund, Steve Romick’s FPA Crescent (FPACX), earns both five stars and a Gold analyst rating.

Like the other FPA funds, FPA International Value is looking to buy world-class companies at substantial discounts.

We always demand that our investments meet the following criteria:

  1. High quality businesses with long-term staying power.
  2. Overall financial strength and ability to weather market dislocations.
  3. Management teams that allocate capital in a value creative manner.
  4. Significant discount to the intrinsic value of the business.

The managers will follow a good company for years if necessary, waiting for an opportunity to purchase its stock at a price they’re willing to pay.  Founding co-manager Eric Bokota said that they’d purchase if the discount to fair value was at least 33% but would begin “lightening up” on the position while the discount narrowed to 17%; that is, they buy deeply discounted stocks and begin to sell modestly discounted ones.

Mr. Bokota argues that the long-term success of the strategy rises as market volatility rises.  First, the managers have been assessing possible purchase targets for years, in many cases.  Part of that assessment is how corporate management handles “market dislocations.”  Bokota’s argument is that short-term dislocations strengthen the best companies by giving them the opportunity to acquire less-seasoned competitors or to acquire market share from them.  Second, their willingness to hold cash (around 22% of the portfolio, as of the end of July 2012) means that they have the resources to act when the time is right and an automatic cushion when the time isn’t.

Bokota holds that the fund has four competitive distinctions:

  1. It holds stocks of all sizes, from $400 million to multinational mega-caps
  2. It holds cash rather than lower quality or higher cost stocks
  3. It maintains its absolute value orientation in all markets
  4. It is unusually concentrated, with a target of 25-35 names in the portfolio.  As of late July, the portfolio is just below 25 names.  That’s consistent in line with Mr. Bokota’s observation that “anything north of 15 to 20 names” offers about as much diversification benefit as you’re going to get.

The fund’s early performance (top 1% of its peer group for the first seven months of 2012 with muted volatility) is entirely encouraging.  That said, there are three reasons for caution:

First, the management team is still evolving.  The fund launched in December 2011 with two co-managers, Eric Bokota and Pierre Py.  Both were analysts at Harris/Oakmark and they shared responsibility for the portfolio.  They were not supported by any research analysts, which Bokota described as a manageable arrangement because their universe of investable stocks is quite small and both he and Py loved research.  In July 2012, Mr. Bokota suddenly resigned for pressing personal reasons.  Py and FPA immediately began a search for two analysts, one of whom spokesman Ryan Leggio described as “a senior analyst.”  Their hope was to have the matter settled by the end of the summer, but the question was open at the time of this writing.

Second, this is the manager’s first fund.  While Mr. Py doubtless excelled as a member of Oakmark’s well-respected analyst corps, he has not previously been the lead guy and hasn’t had to deal with the demands of marketing and of fickle investors.

Third, FPA’s discipline lends itself to periods of dismal relative performance especially during sharply rising markets.  Sadly, rising markets are when investors are most willing to check portfolios daily and most likely to dump what they perceive to be “laggards.”  Investors with relatively high turnover fund portfolio (folks who “actively manage” their portfolios by trading funds in search of what’s hot) are likely to be poorly served by FPA’s steady discipline.

Bottom Line

FPA lends a fine pedigree to this fund, their first new offering in almost 20 years (they acquired Crescent in the early 1990s) and their first new fund launch in almost 30.  While the FPIVX team has considerable autonomy, it’s clear that they also believe passionately in FPA’s absolute value orientation and are well-supported by their new colleagues.  While FPIVX certainly will not spend every year in the top tier and will likely spend some years in the bottom one, there are few with better long-term prospects.

Fund website

FPAInternationalValue

[cr2012]

August 2012, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

Dreyfus ACWI Ex-U.S. Index Fund

Dreyfus ACWI Ex-U.S. Index Fund seeks to match the performance of the Morgan Stanley Capital International All Country World Ex-U.S. Index (MSCI ACWI Ex-US Index). The fund’s portfolio managers, Thomas J. Durante, Karen Q. Wong and Richard A. Brown, select portfolio investments for the fund using a “sampling” process so that the securities, market capitalizations, country and industry weightings and other fundamental benchmark characteristics of the fund’s portfolio are similar to those of the MSCI ACWI Ex-US Index as a whole. The fund may enter into futures contracts and other financial instruments to manage its short-term liquidity or as a substitute for comparable market positions in the securities included the MSCI ACWI Ex-US Index. The expense ratio has not yet been set. The minimum initial investment is $2,500 for investor shares, with a $100 minimum for subsequent investments.

Huntington Longer Duration Fixed Income Fund

Huntington Longer Duration Fixed Income Fund seeks total return from a non-diversified portfolio of longer duration fixed income instruments. They can invest in securities issued by various U.S. and non-U.S. public- or private-sector entities, though only 20% can be in non-dollar-denominated issues.  They can also hedge their currency exposure.   The average portfolio duration equals the Barclays Capital Long Term Government/Credit Index, plus or minus two years.   Kirk Mentzer leads their management team. Expense ratio 1.08%, no redemption fee. The minimum initial purchase for the Fund’s Trust Shares is $1,000.

Icon Opportunities Fund

Icon Opportunities Fund seeks capital appreciation by investing in U.S. small cap stocks that are “underpriced relative to value” (as opposed to “overpriced relative to coffee”?).  Dr Craig Callahan, Founder, President and Chairman of the Investment Committee, and Scott Callahan, are the Portfolio Managers.  Expense ratio 1.50%, no redemption fee. The minimum initial investment is $1,000.

KKR Alternative High Yield Fund

KKR Alternative High Yield Fund seeks to generate an attractive total return consisting of a high level of current income and capital appreciation. The fund will invest in a portfolio of fixed-income investments, including high yield bonds, notes, debentures, convertible securities and preferred stock, with the potential for attractive risk-adjusted returns. The Adviser seeks to identify and capture discounts or premiums over purchase price in response to changes in market environments and credit events. The majority of the Fund’s investments are expected to be in fixed-income instruments issued by U.S. companies, but the Fund may, from time to time, be invested outside the United States, including investments in issuers located in emerging markets. The Fund will not invest more than 30% of its total assets in non-U.S. dollar-denominated securities or instruments issued by non-U.S. issuers that are not publicly traded in the United States. The Fund may also invest in loans and loan participations. The Fund may seek to obtain market exposure to the securities and instruments in which it invests by investing in ETFs and may invest in various types of derivatives, including swaps, futures and options, and structured products in pursuing its investment objective or for hedging purposes. The Fund is co-managed by Erik A. Falk, Frederick M. Goltz, Christopher A. Sheldon and William C. Sonneborn. Expenses and minimum initial investments have not yet been determined.

Scout Emerging Markets Fund

Scout Emerging Markets Fund seeks long-term growth by investing in emerging market stocks.  For their purposes, e.m. stocks include firms domiciled in developed markets “that derive a majority of their revenue from emerging market countries” and as well those in the MSCI Frontier Markets Index. They’ll try to remain diversified by country and industry, but market events might force them to be less so. Mark G. Weber, a former Morningstar equity analyst who co-managed Scout International Discovery, leads the management team. Expense ratio 1.40%, no redemption fee. Minimum initial investment is $1000 for standard accounts and $100 for IRAs.

TIAA-CREF Social Choice Bond Fund

TIAA-CREF Social Choice Bond Fund seeks a favorable long-term total return while preserving capital and giving special consideration to certain social criteria. The Fund primarily invests in a broad range of investment-grade bonds and fixed-income securities, but may also invest in other fixed-income securities, including those of non-investment grade quality. Fund investments are subject to certain environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) screening criteria provided by a vendor of the Fund, MSCI, Inc. The ESG evaluation process generally favors corporate issuers that are: (i) strong stewards of the environment; (ii) committed to serving local communities where they operate and to human rights and philanthropy; (iii) committed to higher labor standards for their own employees and those in the supply chain; (iv) dedicated to producing high-quality and safe products; and (v) managed in an exemplary and ethical manner. Additionally, Advisors targets 10% of the Fund’s assets to be invested in fixed-income instruments that reflect proactive social investments that provide direct exposure to socially beneficial issuers and/or individual projects such as: affordable housing, community and economic development, renewable energy and climate change, and natural resources. The fund will be managed by Stephen M. Liberatore, Joseph Higgins, and Steven Raab. The expense ratio for retail class investors is 0.75%, with a minimum initial investment of $2,000 for Traditional IRA, Roth IRA and Coverdell accounts and $2,500 for all other account types. Subsequent investments for all account types must be at least $100. There is no minimum initial or subsequent investment for Retirement Class shares offered through employer-sponsored employee benefit plans, with a 0.65% expense ratio.

Vanguard Short-Term Inflation-Protected Securities Index Fund

Vanguard Short-Term Inflation-Protected Securities Index Fund seeks to track the performance of the Barclays U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) 0-5 Year Index. The Fund attempts to replicate the target index by investing all, or substantially all, of its assets in the securities that make up the Index, holding each security in approximately the same proportion as its weighting in the Index. The fund will be managed by Joshua C. Barrickman and Gemma Wright-Casparius. The expense ratio has not yet been set, but as a Vanguard fund can be expected to be low. The minimum initial investment is $3,000 for investor shares, with $100 minimum for subsequent investments.

July 1, 2012

By David Snowball

thermometer

photo by rcbodden on Flickr.

Dear friends,

“Summertime and the livin’ is easy”?

“Roll out those lazy, hazy, crazy days of summer,
Those days of soda and pretzels and beer”

“That’s when I had most of my fun back …
Hot fun in the summertime.”

“In summer, the song sings itself.”

What a crock.  I’m struck by the intensity of the summer storms, physical and financial.  As I write, millions are without power along the Eastern seaboard after a ferocious storm that pounded the Midwest, roared east and killed a dozen.  Wildfires continue unchecked in the west and the heat and drought in Iowa have left the soil in my yard fissured and hard.  Conditions in the financial markets are neither better nor more settled.  The ferocious last day rally in June created the illusion of a decent month, when in fact it was marked by a series of sharp, panicky dislocations.

I’m struck, too, by the ways in which our political leaders have responded, which is to say, idiotically.  Republicans continue to deny the overwhelming weight of climate science.  Democrats acknowledge it, then freeze for fear of losing their jobs.  And both sides’ approach to the post-election fiscal cliff is the same: “let’s get through the election first.”

It’s striking, finally, how rarely the thought “let’s justify being elected” seems to get any further than “let’s convince voters that the other side is worse.”

Snippets from MIC

I had the pleasure of attending the Morningstar Investment Conference in late June.  The following stories are derived from my observations there.  I also had an opportunity to interview two international value managers, David Marcus of Evermore and Eric Bokota of FPA, there.  Those interviews will serve as elements of an update of the Evermore Global Value profile and a new FPA International Value profile, both in August.

David Snowball at MIC, courtesy of eventtoons.com

BlackRock and the Graybeards

On Day One of the conference, Morningstar hosted a keynote panel titled “A Quarter-Century Club” in which a trio of quarter-centenarians (Susan Byrne, Will Danof and Brian Rogers) reflected in their years in the business.  All three seemed to offer the same cautionary observation: “the industry has lost its moral compass.”  All three referred to the pressure, especially on publicly traded firms, to “grow assets” as the first priority and “serve shareholders” somewhere thereafter.

Susan Byrne, chairman and founder of Westwood Management Corp., the investment advisor to the Westwood Funds, notes that, as a young manager, it was drilled into her head that “this is not our money.” It was money held in trust, “there are people who trust you (the manager) individually to take care for them.” That’s a tremendously important value to her but, she believes, many younger professionals don’t hear the lesson.

Will Danoff, manager of Fidelity Contrafund (FCNTX), made a thoughtful, light-hearted reference to one of his early co-workers, George.  “George didn’t manage money and he didn’t manage the business.  His job, so far as I can tell, was to walk up to the president every morning, look him in the eye and ask ‘how are you going to make money today for our shareholders?’ You don’t hear that much anymore.”

Brian Rogers, CIO of T Rowe Price made a similar, differently nuanced point: “when we were hired, it was by far smaller firms with a sense of fiduciary obligation, not a publicly-traded company with an obligation to shareholders. Back then we learned this order of priorities: (1) your investors first, (2) your employees and then (3) your shareholders.” In an age of large, publicly-traded firms, “new folks haven’t learned that as deeply.”

As I talk with managers of small funds, I often get a clear sense of personal connection with their shareholders and a deep concern for doing right by them. In a large, revenue-driven firm, that focus might be lost.

The extent of that loss has been highlighted by some very solid reporting by Aaron Pressman and Jessica Toonkel of Reuters.   Pressman and Toonkel document what looks like the unraveling of BlackRock, the world’s largest private investment manager. In short order:

  • Robert Capaldi, senior client strategist for Chief Executive Laurence Fink, left.
  • Susan Wagner, a founding partner and vice chairman, announced her immediate retirement.  Wagner had overseen much of BlackRock’s growth-through-acquisition strategy which included purchase of Barclay’s Global Investors and Merrill Lynch’s funds, a total of $2.4 trillion in assets.
  • Chief equity strategist Boll Doll announced his retirement (at 57) as evidence began to surface that his and BlackRock’s long-time claim of “proprietary” investment models was false.
  • Star energy fund manager Daniel Rice resigned in the wake of criticism of his decision to invest substantial amounts of his shareholders’ money into a firm in which he had a personal, if indirect, stake.  He did so without notifying anyone outside of the firm.  BlackRock, reportedly, had no explanation for investors.

Insiders report to Reuters that “further senior-level changes” are imminent.

BlackRock’s plans to double its mutual fund business in the next 18 months by targeting RIAs remain in place.  Why double the business?  Whose interests does it serve?  BlackRock has demonstrated neither any great surplus of investment talent nor of innovative investment ideas, nor can they plausibly appeal (at $4 trillion of AUM) to “economies of scale.”

No, doubling their business is in the best interests of BlackRock executives (bonuses get tied to such things) and, likely, to BlackRock shareholders.  There’s no evidence for why RIAs or fundholders are anything more than tools in BlackRock’s incessant drive from growth.  The American essayist and critic Edward Abbey observed, “Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.”  And, apparently, of the publicly traded megacorp.

Advice from a Conservative Domestic Equity Manager: Go Elsewhere

The Quarter Century panel of senior started talking about the equity market going forward. They were uniformly, if cautiously, optimistic. Rogers drew some parallels to the economy and market of 1982. I liked Susan Byrne’s comments rather more: “It feels like 1982 when you believed that any rally was a trap, designed to fool me, humiliate me and keep me poor.” Mr. Danoff argued that global blue chips “have absolutely flat-lined for years,” and represent substantial embedded value. They argued for pursuing stocks with growing dividends, a strategy that will consistently beat fixed income or inflation.

In closing, Don Phillips asked each for one bit of closing advice or insight. Brian Rogers, T. Rowe Price’s CIO and manager of their Equity Income fund (PRFDX) offered these two:

1. it’s time to remember Buffett’s adage, “be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful.”

and

2. “take a look at the emerging markets again.”

That’s striking advice, given Mr. Rogers’ style: he’s famously cautious and consistent, invests in large dividend-paying companies and rarely ventures abroad (5% international, 0.25% emerging markets). He didn’t elaborate but his observation is consistent with the recurring theme, “emerging markets are beginning to look interesting again.”

Note to the Scout Funds: “See Grammarian”

The marketing slogan for the Scout Funds is “See Further.”  Uhhh .. no.  “Farther.”  In this usage, “further” would be “additional,” as in “see further references in the footnotes.”  Farther refers to distance (“dad, how much farther is it?”) which is presumably what would concern a scout.

Scout’s explanation for the odd choice: “One of our executives wanted ‘See Farther’ but discovered that some other fund company already used it and so he went with ‘See Further’ instead.”

I see.

No, I don’t.  First, I can’t find a record for the “see farther” motto (though it is plausible) and, second, that still doesn’t justify an imprecise and ungrammatical slogan.

Kudos to Morningstar: They Get It Right, and Make It Right, Quickly

In June I complained about inconsistencies in Morningstar’s data reports on expense ratios and turnover, and the miserable state of the Securities and Exchange Commission database.

The folks at Morningstar looked into the problems quite quickly. The short version is this: fund filings often contain multiple versions of what’s apparently the same data point. There are, for example, a couple different turnover ratios and up to four expense ratios. Different functions, developed by different folks at different times, might inadvertently choose to pull stats from different places. Mr. Rekenthaler described them as “these funny little quirks where a product somewhere sometime decided to do something different.” Both stats are correct but also inconsistent. If they aren’t flagged so that readers can understand the differences, they can also be misleading.

Morningstar is interested in providing consistent, system-wide data.  Both John Rekenthaler, vice president of research, and Alexa Auerbach in corporate communications were in touch with us within a week. Once they recognized the inconsistency, they moved quickly to reconcile it.  Rekenthaler reports that their data-improvement effort is ongoing: “senior management is on a push for Morningstar-wide consistency in what data we publish and how we label the data, so we should be ferreting out the remaining oddities.”  As of June 19, the data had been reconciled. Thanks to the Wizards on West Wacker for their quick work.

FBR Funds Get Sold, Quickly

On June 26 2012, FBR announced the sale of their mutual fund unit to Hennessy Advisors.   Of the 10 FBR funds, seven will retain their current management teams. The managers of FBR’s Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap funds are getting dumped and their funds are merging into Hennessy funds. One of the mergers (Large Cap) is likely a win for the investors. One of the mergers (Mid Cap) is a loss and the third (Small Cap) has the appearance of a disaster.

FBR Large Cap (FBRPX, 1.25% e.r., 9.2% over three years) merges into Hennessy Cornerstone Large Growth (HFLGX), three year old large value fund, 1.3% e.r., 13.8% over 3 years. Win for the FBR shareholders.

FBR Mid Cap (FBRMX, 1.35% e.r., five year return of 3.0%) merges into Hennessy Focus 30 (HFTFX), midcap fund, 1.36% e.r., five year return of 1.25%. Higher minimum, same e.r., lower returns – loss for FBR shareholders.

FBR Small Cap (FBRYX, 1.45% e.r., five year return of 4.25%) merges into Hennessy Cornerstone Growth (HGCGX), small growth fund, 1.33% e.r., five year return of (8.2). Huh? Slightly lower expenses but a huge loss in performance. The 1250 basis point difference is 5-year performance does not appear to be a fluke. The Hennessy fund is consistently at the bottom of its peer group, going back a decade.   The fact that founder and CIO Neil Hennessy runs Cornerstone Growth might explain the decision to preserve the weaker fund and its strategy. This is a clear “run away!” for the FBR shareholders.

One alternative for FBRYX investors is into FBR’s own Small Cap Financial fund (FBRSX), run by Dave Ellison, FBR’s CIO. Ellison’s funds used to bear the FBR Pegasus brand. The fund only invests in the finance industry, but does it really well. That said, it’s more expensive than FBRYX with weaker returns, reflecting the sector’s disastrous decade.

The fate of FBR’s Gas Utility Index fund (GASFX) is unclear.  The key question is whether Hennessy will increase fees.  An FBR representative at Morningstar expressed doubt that they’d do any such thing.

The Long-Short Summer Series: Trying to Know if You’re Winning

As part of our summer series on long-short funds, we look this month at the performance of the premier long-short funds, of interesting newcomers, and of two benchmarks.

The challenge is to know when you’re winning if your goal is not the easily measurable “maximum total return.”  With long-short funds, you’re shooting for something more amorphous, akin to “pretty solid returns without the volatility that makes me crazy.”  In pursuit of funds that meet those criteria, we looked at the performance of long-short funds on one terrible day (June 1) and one great day (June 29), as well as during one terrible month (May 2012) and one really profitable period (January – June, 2012).

We looked at the return of Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index fund for each period, and highlighted (in green) those funds which managed to lose half as much as the market in the two down periods (May and June 1) but gain at least two-thirds of the market in the two up periods.  Here are the results, sorted by 2012 returns.

May 2012

(down)

June 1

(down)

June 29

(up)

2012, through July 1

Royce Opportunity Select

(6.3)

(4.0)

2.9

16.8

RiverPark Long Short Oppy

(5.3)

(2.0)

1.6

16.7 – mostly as a hedge fund

Vanguard Total Stock Market

(6.2)

(2.6)

2.6

9.3

Marketfield

(0.1)

(2.25)

1.2

8.8

Vanguard Balanced Index

(3.3)

(1.4)

1.5

6.5

Robeco Long Short

(0.6)

0.1

0.3

6.1

Caldwell & Orkin Market Oppy

0.1

(2.3)

1.5

4.7

ASTON/River Road Long Short

(3.1)

(0.2)

1.8

4.6

Bridgeway Managed Volatility

(2.4)

(1.8)

1.6

4.2

James Long Short

(3.0)

(0.9)

0.7

4.0

Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Research

 

(4.8)

1.25

3.8

RiverPark/Gargoyle Hedged Value

(5.5)

(2.2)

1.4

2.7 –  mostly as a hedge fund

Schwab Hedged Equity

(3.3)

(1.7)

1.9

2.5

GRT Absolute Return

(2.0)

(0.1)

1.4

1.7

Wasatch Long-Short

(6.3)

(1.3)

2.0

1.3

Forester Value

(0.5)

0.25

0.8

1.2

ASTON/MD Sass Enhanced Equity

(4.4)

(0.6)

1.5

1.1

Turner Spectrum

(2.5)

(0.6)

0.4

(0.1)

Paladin Long Short

(0.9)

(0.1)

0.1

(1.9)

Hussman Strategic Growth

2.8

1.3

(1.3)

(7.6)

As we noted last month, in comparing the long-term performance of long-short funds to a very conservative bond index, consistent winners are hard to find.  Interesting possibilities from this list:

RiverPark Long Short Opportunity (RLSFX), which converted from an in-house hedge fund in March and which we’ll profile in August.

Marketfield (MFLDX), the mutual fund version of a global macro hedge fund, which we’re profiling this month.

ASTON/River Road Long Short (ARLSX), a disciplined little fund that we profiled last month.

New on our radar is Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Research (BPRRX), sibling to the one indisputable gold-standard fund in the group, Robeco Long Short (BPLEX).  While the two follow the same investment discipline, BPLEX has a singular focus on small and micro stocks while BPRRX has a more traditional mid- to large-cap portfolio.

The chart below tracks BPPRX against its peer group average (orange) and the group’s top funds, including BPLEX (green), Marketfield (burgundy), and Wasatch (gold).  BPPRX itself is the blue line.

Since inception, BPRRX has been (1) well above average and (2) well below BPLEX.  It’s worth further research.

FundReveal perspective on Long-Short funds

Our collaborators at FundReveal are back, and are weighing-in with a discussion of long-short funds based on their fine-grained daily volatility and return data.  Their commentary follows, and is expanded-upon at their blog.


 

Nearly all of the Long-Short funds examined exhibit consistently low risk.  Many of them also beat the S&P 500’s Average Daily Returns.  Of the six funds analyzed by David (see bullets below) those rated as “A-Best” in one year most often beat the S&P in total returns the next year, a finding consistent with the out-of-sample forward testing that we have conducted for the entire market.

One thing that remains surprising is that the Long-Short funds great idea hasn’t really panned out.  It makes such sense to use all positive and negative information about companies and securities available when investing.   Doesn’t only investing long leave “money [information] on the table.”  But, in general, these funds have not delivered on that perceived potential.

BPLSX, Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Fund has been delivering.  We agree with David that it can be seen as the gold standard.  From FundReveal’s perspective, the fund has persistently delivered “A-Best” performance, beating the S&P on both risk and return measures. Since 2005 the fund has been rated A-Best six times and C twice.  This includes a whopping 82% total return in 2009.  In 2009, 2010, and 2011 positive total returns followed A Best risk return rating in the preceding year.  Don’t get too excited:  the fund is closed.

David has commented or will comment on the following funds in the Mutual Fund Observer.

  • ARLSX  – Aston/River Road Long/Short
  • FMLSX – Wasatch 1st Source Long/Short
  • MFLDX – Marketfield Fund
  • AMBEX – Aston/River Long/Short
  • JAZZX – James Advantage Long/Short
  • GRTHX – GRT Absolute Return Fund

Good:

The two funds with positive investment decision-making attributes based on the FundReveal model are FMLSX and MFLDX.  Both persistently deliver A-Best risk-return performance, and relatively high Persistence Ratings, a measurement of the likelihood of A performance in the future: FMLSX: 40%, and MFLDX: 44%.

Not so Good:

JAZZX has demonstrated high Volatility and low Average Daily Return relative to its peers and the S&P.   It has only been in existence a short time; we have data from 2011 and 2012 YTD, but it is not faring well.   A wait and see position is probably justified.

Some additional candidates for consideration garnered from the FundReveal “Best Funds List” (free the FundReveal site).

VMNFX Vanguard Market Neutral Fund.  A solid low risk fund with 45% Persistence.  It has not hit the ball out of the park, but the team is demonstrating good decision- making as inferred from FundReveal measurements.

ALHIX American Century Equity Market Neutral Fund.  A solid fund with 4% volatility, market beating Average Daily Return in 2011, and Persistence of 44%.

FLSRX Forward Long/Short Credit Analysis Fund.  This fund may not even belong in this discussion since the others are stock funds.  Morningstar classifies this as an alternative bond fund.  Its portfolio is nearly exclusively Muni Bonds.  It is 34% Short and 132% Long in the Muni Bonds that make up 99% of its portfolio.  It has low Volatility, high Average Daily Return, Persistence Rating of 44%, and extraordinary performance in down markets (32% above the S&P).

A complete version of this analysis with tables and graphics is available on the FundReveal blog.

Best of the Web: Our Summer Doldrums Edition

Our contributing editor, Junior Yearwood, in collaboration with financial planner Johanna Fox-Turner have fine-tuned their analysis of retirement income calculators, a discussion they initiated last month.  In addition, Junior added a review of Chuck Jaffe’s new MoneyLife podcast.  Drop by Best of the Web to sample both!

Two Funds and Why They’re Really Worth Your While

Each month, the Observer profiles between two and four mutual funds that you likely have not heard about, but really should have.  Our “Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers” do not yet have a long track record, but have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “stars in the shadows” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought. Two intriguing  funds are:

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX): Andrew Foster, who performed brilliantly as a risk-conscious emerging Asia manager for Matthews, is now leading this Asia-centric diversified emerging markets fund.  It builds on his years of experience and maintains its cautiousness, while adding substantial flexibility.

Marketfield (MFLDX): there are two reasons to read, now and closely, about Marketfield.  One, it’s about the most successful alternative-investment fund available to retail investors.  Two, it’s just been bought by New York Life and will be slapped with a front-end load come October.  Investors wanting to maintain access to no-load shares need to think, now, about their options.

Rest in Peace: Industry Leaders Fund (ILFIX)

I note with sadness the closing of Industry Leaders fund, a small sensible fund run by Gerry Sullivan, a remarkably principled investor.  The fund identified industries in which there was either one or two dominant players, invested equally in them and rebalanced periodically.  The idea (patented) was to systematically exclude sectors where leaders never emerged or were quickly overthrown.  The fund did brilliantly for the first half of its existence and passably in the second half, weighed down by exposure to global financial firms, but never managed any marketing track.

Sullivan continues as the (relatively new) manager of Vice Fund (VICEX), which has a long and oddly-distinguished record.

Briefly noted …

Several months ago we reported on the Zacks fund rating service, noting that it was sloppy, poorly explained, unclear, and possibly illogical.  Doubtless emboldened by our praise, Mitch and Ben Zacks have launched two ETFs: Zacks Sustainable Dividend ETF and Zacks MLP ETF.  There’s no evident need for either, an observation quite irrelevant in the world of ETFs.

Small Wins for Investors

Schwab reduced the expense ratio on Laudus Small-Cap MarketMasters (SWOSX) by 10 basis points and Laudus International MarketMasters (SWOIX) by 19 basis points.

Forward Frontier Strategy (FRNMX) has capped the fund’s expenses at 1.09 – 1.49%, depending on share class.

The three Primecap Odyssey funds (Stock POSKX, Growth POGRX and Aggressive Growth POAGX) have all dropped their 2% redemption fees.  That’s not really much of a win for investors since the redemption fees are designed to discourage rapid trading of fund shares (which is a bad thing), but I take what small gains I can find.

Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity (TEMAX) has reopened to new investors after 16 months.

Former Seligman Manager in Insider-Trading Case

The SEC announced that former Seligman Communications and Information comanager Reema Shah pled guilty to securities fraud and is barred permanently from the securities industry. The SEC says that Shah and a Yahoo (YHOO) executive swapped insider tips and that the Seligman fund she comanaged and others at the firm netted a $389,000 profit from trading based on insider information on Yahoo.

Farewells

Gary Motyl, chief investment officer for the Franklin, Templeton, and Mutual Series fund families, passed away.  Motyl was one of Sir John Templeton’s first hires and he’s been Franklin’s CIO for 12 years.  Pending the appointment of a new CIO later this summer, his duties are being covered by three other members of Franklin’s staff.

Closings

Delaware Select Growth (DVEAX) closed to new month on June 8th.

Franklin Double Tax-Free Income (FPRTX) initiated a soft close on June 15th and will switch to a hard close on August 1st.

Prudential Jennison Health Sciences (PHLAX) closed on June 29th after siphoning up $300 million in 18 months.

For those interested, The Wall Street Journal publishes a complete closed fund list each month.  It’s available online with the almost-poetic name, Table of Mutual Funds Closed to New Investors.

Old Wine, New Bottles

JPMorgan Asia Pacific Focus has changed its name to JPMorgan Asia Pacific (JASPX). The management of the team will be Mark Davids and Geoff Hoare.

Columbia Strategic Investor (CSVAX) will be renamed Columbia Global Dividend Opportunity. Actually it will become an entirely different fund under the guise of being “tweaked.”  I love it when they do that.  The former small cap and convertibles fund gets reborn as an all-cap global stock fund benchmarked against the MSCI All World Country Index. CSVAX’s managers have been fired and replaced by a team of guys who already run six other Columbia funds.

Ivy International Balanced (IVBAX) is being renamed Ivy Global Income Allocation.  It also picked up a second manager.

Off to the Dustbin of History

September will be the last issue of SmartMoney, a magazine once head-and-shoulders sharper and more data-driven than its peers.  According to a phone rep for SmartMoney, Dow is likely to convert SmartMoney.com into a pay site.  Dow will, they promise, “beef up” the online version and add editorial staff.  Plans have not yet been made final, but it sounds like SmartMoney subscribers will get free access to the site and might get downloadable versions of the articles.

It was a busy month for Acadia Principal Conservation Fund (APCVX).  On June one, the board cut its offensively high 12(b)1 fee in half (to an industry-standard 0.25%) and dropped its expense ratio by 10 basis points.  On June 25th, they closed and liquidated the fund.  On the upside, the fund (mostly) preserved principal in its two years of existence.  On the downside, it made no money for its investors and had a negative real return.  Still, that doesn’t speak to the coherence of their planning.

Effective June 1, Bridgeway Aggressive Investors 2 (which I once dubbed “Bridgeway Not Quite So Aggressive Investors”) and Micro-Cap Limited both ceased to exist, having merged into Aggressive Investors 1 (BRAGX) and Ultra-Small Company (BRUSX).  Both of the remaining funds had long, brilliant runs before getting nailed in recent years by the apparent implosion of Bridgeway’s quant models.

Fido plans to merge Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector All Cap (FARAX) into Fidelity Stock Selector All Cap (FDSSX), which would lead to an expense reduction for the Advisor shareholders.  By year’s end, Fidelity will merge Mid Cap Growth (FSMGX) into Stock Selector Mid Cap Fund (FSSMX). They’ve already closed Mid Cap Growth in preparation for the move.

JPMorgan Asia Equity (JAEAX) is being liquidated on July 20, 2012.  It’s a bad fund that has seen massive outflows.  The managers, nonetheless, will remain with JPMorgan.

Nuveen Large Cap Value (FASKX) merges into Nuveen Dividend Value (FFEIX), also in October.  That’s a win for Large Cap shareholders: they get the same management team and a comparable strategy with lower expenses.

Oppenheimer Fixed Income Active Allocation (OAFAX) will merge into Oppenheimer Global Strategic Income (OPSIX) in early October, 2012.

Victory Value (SVLSX), which spiraled from mediocre to awful in the last two years, will liquidate at the end of August.  Friends and mourners still have access to Victory Special Value (SSVSX, a weak mid-cap growth fund) and Victory Established Value (VETAX, actually very solid mid-cap value fund).

I’m off to Washington for the Fourth of July week with family.  Preparation for that trip and ten days of often-hectic travel in June kept me from properly thanking several contributors (thanks!  A formal acknowledgement is coming!) and from completing profiles of a couple fascinating funds: Cook and Bynum (COBYX) and FPA International (FPIVX), one of which will be part of a major set of new profiles in August.

Until then, take care, keep cool and celebrate family!